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Civil Rights Law Equity: An
Introduction to a Theory of What Civil
Rights Has Become
John Valery White*
Abstract
This Article argues that civil rights law is better understood
as civil rights equity. It contends that the four-decade-long
project of restricting civil rights litigation has shaped civil rights
jurisprudence into a contemporary version of traditional equity.
For years commentators have noted the low success rates of civil
rights suits and debated the propriety of increasingly restrictive
procedural and substantive doctrines. Activists have lost faith in
civil rights litigation as an effective tool for social change,
instead seeking change in administrative forums, or by asserting
political pressure through social media and activism to compel
policy change. As for civil rights litigation, activists have, most
damningly, ignored it. This Article makes a preliminary case for
understanding civil rights jurisprudence as a contemporary
version of traditional equity, available in limited circumstances
to address extraordinary violations of rights. Civil rights
litigation has become a limited tool: inappropriate for driving
social change, unreliable for litigants involved in everyday
disputes, and mostly incapable of articulating and developing
rights through precedent. Judges are the powerful, central
figures in this litigation. And the rights landscape is structured
by the capabilities and demands of the kind of equity regime civil
* Ralph Denton Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Boyd School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 1991; B.A., Southern University,
1988. This project benefitted from the input of my Boyd School of Law
Colleagues Ian Bartrum, Thomas Main, Nancy Rapoport, Addie Rolnick,
Jeanne Price, and the research help of Lena Rieke (now a research librarian
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rights litigation has become. What emerges is a vision of the
courts as protectors of the status quo in social and political
relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil rights “law” has become civil rights “equity.”
Specifically, civil rights jurisprudence has taken on the
attributes of traditional equity, and civil rights litigation has
come to fill the role traditional equity once occupied. Civil rights
equity contrasts sharply with current usage of the term “equity”
as a synonym for equality, or even justice. Civil rights equity
represents not the achievement of an equanimous status in law
or society, so much as it is the reduction of the role of civil rights
litigation to the supplemental role of traditional equity,
characterized by and limited to addressing outrages for
deserving individuals.
In the days after George Floyd’s death, protests erupted
across the country.1 These protests sought to change police
use-of-force practices that have led to the killing of Black people,
often in response to suspicion of minor crimes, as was the case
with
Mr.
Floyd.2
These
protests
reanimated
the
#Blacklivesmatter movement of 2015, which accompanied
campus protests for racial justice and the #MeToo movement.3
Collectively, these might be viewed as a New Civil Rights
Movement—the power of which was reflected in the widespread,
multiethnic nature of the antiracist protests of the summer of

1. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/JQF9-75P3.
2. See Alex Altman, Why the Killing of George Floyd Sparked an
American Uprising, TIME (June 4, 2020, 6:49 AM), https://perma.cc/324HAJU7.
3. See Linda S. Greene et al., Talking About Black Lives Matter and
#MeToo, 34 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 109, 110–14 (2019).
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2020, as well as the central place those protests occupied in the
political imagination at that time.4
As civil rights movements, the summer 2020 protests, like
those in 2015, have a strange (even strained) relationship with
civil rights law; civil rights litigation is ever-present but
decidedly peripheral to this New Civil Rights Movement and its
pronounced goals. Since 2015, the families of prominent victims
of police violence have been represented by attorneys pursuing
compensation for civil rights violations. Indeed, in many of the
cases they have been represented by the same lawyer, Ben
Crump, who secured settlements in several of the prominent
cases.5 Similarly, many of the women accusing Harvey
Weinstein of sexual assault and rape are suing him and the
companies he led.6 But in neither instance is civil rights law
central; the litigation is seen as attaining needed compensation
for the victims, but few view the lawsuits as effective
deterrents.7 Mr. Crump voiced this concern following the
4. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/4LAY67LM.
5. See Tyler Foggatt, Who Is the Floyd Family’s Lawyer?, NEW YORKER
(June 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/8UDV-ETN3
In 2012, after Trayvon Martin was killed by George Zimmerman, in
a suburb of Orlando, Martin’s family hired Crump, who is based in
Tallahassee, to represent them. He made the rounds on cable news
to talk about the case; shortly afterward, protests erupted in
Florida. (Zimmerman was eventually acquitted.) Two years later,
Crump took on another high-profile case, after Michael Brown was
shot dead by Darren Wilson, a police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri.
(More protests; Wilson was never charged.) Now Crump is
representing the family of George Floyd, who was killed, three
weeks ago, by Derek Chauvin, a cop in Minneapolis, who knelt on
Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes.
Minneapolis settled with Mr. Floyd’s family in March 2021. Rachel Treisman,
Minneapolis Reaches $27 Million Settlement with Family of George Floyd,
NPR (Mar. 12, 2021, 2:21 PM), https://perma.cc/HYQ8-3ADW.
6. See, e.g., Complaint at 55–74, Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, No.
17-cv-09554 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 6, 2017); Complaint at 42–56, Doe 1 v. Weinstein
Co. Holdings, No. 17-cv-08323 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017); see also Jan Ransom
& Danielle Ivory, ‘Heartbroken’: Weinstein Accusers Say $44 Million
Settlement Lets Him off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/K6GA-9UAY (“Zoe Brock, a former model who has accused
Harvey Weinstein of sexually inappropriate behavior, said she once viewed a
lawsuit against him as her best opportunity to hold him to account.”).
7. See Treisman, supra note 5.
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announcement of a settlement in the killing of Mr. Floyd.8 He is
reported to harbor
mixed feelings about whether civil settlements actually serve
to deter police violence, noting that while they may motivate
city governments to make changes, they have not necessarily
been proved to do so. . . . Crump said that to him, progress
would mean justice—which is not the same as accountability.
“The only thing George Floyd could get is accountability,
Breonna can only get accountability, you know, Ahmaud
Arbery can only get accountability,” he said. “Because the
reality is, justice would be them still here with us living.”9

Indeed, some commentators have come to question the
propriety of taxpayers paying judgments for police practices the
taxpayers might not support.10 In any case, change is expected
to come from political and administrative avenues in response
to protests.11 If any judicial process is crucial for many activists,
it is the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, whether the
perpetrators are police utilizing excessive force or workplace
rapists, that activists consistently and persistently call for.12 It
does not seem too much to say that activists do not believe civil
rights litigation is a useful tool for social change. Notably, when
the summer 2020 protests triggered talk of legislation aimed at
modifying qualified immunity, and thereby facilitating civil

8. See id. (explaining that Mr. Crump does not believe the suits serve as
actual deterrents to police violence).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Andrew Cockburn, Blood Money: Taxpayers Pick Up the Tab
for Police Brutality, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2018, at 61, https://perma.cc/82L42U9S (PDF).
11. The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) policy platform does not list
civil litigation among their policy proposals. See Vision for Black Lives, M4BL,
https://perma.cc/3PFE-6KUY. A news story on Ben Crump highlights hostility
on social media at the intervention of “ambulance chasers” as a distraction
from the movement. See Foggatt, supra note 5.
12. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Few Police Officers Who Cause Deaths Are
Charged or Convicted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/QJ6XPNPL (last updated Apr. 12, 2021) (noting the public outcry to charge police
officers connected to the deaths of Breonna Taylor, Michael Brown, and Carlos
Ingram Lopez).
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rights suits against abusive officers,13 activists were unmoved,14
dismissing such calls in favor of proposals to “defund the
police.”15 Law seemed beside the point, an inappropriate
distraction from efforts for true reform.
Ambivalence to civil rights law derives in part from an
increasingly conservative federal judiciary that has been
inhospitable to civil rights claims.16 This ambivalence is also
consistent with a view of social change that emphasizes political
processes, organization, and activism.17 But the litigation tools
of the Civil Rights Movement seem available, and conservative
activists are energized about using the courts to counteract
policy with which they disagree (and which they feel certain
violates the Constitution).18 Civil rights litigation lives and yet
it seems that the statutes and constitutional rights that were
hard-won in the original Civil Rights Movement have been made
superfluous to the challenges of today. Litigation has become an
inefficient and ineffective tool for change that, though
ephemeral, always requires maximum social and political
capital, mobilized and deployed in the streets.19 Social justice, it
seems, is not to be had through law, and victories are not
effectively memorialized there.
13. See Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges
as Flash Point Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/VKN2-339K (last updated Mar. 8, 2021).
14. “For a growing consortium of progressive groups focused on young
voters, justice for Mr. Floyd requires dismantling police power and investing
in programs related to mental health, housing and education—which activists
believe would reduce crime and violence.” Astead W. Herndon, For George
Floyd’s Mourners, What Does ‘Justice’ Mean?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020),
https://perma.cc/J7X2-ZTZC.
15. See Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the
Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/3PQQ-9UXX.
16. See Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., A Conservative Agenda Unleashed on the
Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/8U9V-SDUC (last
updated Mar. 16, 2020).
17. See Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 360, 400–05 (2018) (discussing the pragmatic approach that
favors other forms of activism and organization over litigation for creating
change).
18. See
Ann
Southworth,
Lawyers
and
the
Conservative
Counterrevolution, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1698, 1709–14 (2018) (explaing how
the conservative movement used originalism as a tool to restrict rights).
19. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941,
958 (2011).
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This Article offers a view as to why. Its focus is on the
nature of civil rights litigation, which has been built around
judicial equity powers from its inception and occupies a role akin
to equity’s traditional role over the years: a means for courts to
provide remedies to individuals in unusual circumstances in
order to achieve justice. Ultimately, civil rights jurisprudence
has become “civil rights equity.”
In the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition, law and
equity were separate, complementary systems.20 Common law
courts and equity courts successively emerged in England after
the Norman conquest, with common law becoming an
independent, formalized system of jurisprudence, and equity
emerging as a system for interposing just results in cases where
the common law was inadequate.21 Equity possessed its own,
complex system of writs, rules, and precedent,22 but in the
United States federal courts, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) and their rejection of formal pleading merged
equity with law.23 Since then, a single system of pleading and
procedure for law and equity has governed, diminishing the
distinction between law and equity in a combined system
focused on attaining justice. This fluid, less formal nature aided
in the emergence of civil rights law and, arguably, eventually
undermined civil rights law’s social change capacity.
Emerging from the ferment of the Civil Rights Movement
and the post-World War II optimism in rights-based legalism,
civil rights threatened to reshape American law. Instead, the
revolutionary potential of civil rights has been refashioned in
recent years along the lines of traditional equity in both formal
and informal ways. Formally, civil rights equity reflects the
central role of equitable remedies in civil rights jurisprudence
and the central importance of sharp limitations on those

20. See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329,
329 (2005) [hereinafter Main, New Equity].
21.
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary
Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 430, 437 n.50 (2003) [hereinafter Main,
Traditional Equity].
22. See generally 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1886).
23. See Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 431.
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remedies.24 Informally, it reflects the subtle influence of
equitable constraints on shaping how courts approach damages
actions, making those actions characteristically procedural with
vaguely defined, fact-intensive rights that operate to give judges
in civil rights cases a role similar to the role of traditional equity
courts.25 The resulting “civil rights equity” limits the force of
rights, confines rights to exceptional circumstances, and
subordinates them to private rights. Civil rights equity runs
counter to Marbury’s dicta that public rights are like private
rights, to be enforced when established.26 Civil rights equity is a
judicial style that has made civil rights exceptional and limited.
It explains the resilience of civil rights, their ever-presence, as
well as their uselessness for activists in this new civil rights era.
The claim that civil rights law has become civil rights equity
is peculiar in at least three ways, the response to which
structures this Article’s delineation of a theory of civil rights
equity. First, civil rights statutes and jurisprudence were
initially created expressly to empower courts to use their equity
powers to dismantle the system of segregation known as Jim
Crow that had emerged after slavery and Reconstruction.27
Congress and the courts seemed to agree that, to take on
dismantling a system as complex and far-reaching as Jim Crow,
required empowering the courts generally, and individual
judges specifically, to utilize their equity powers.28 Though these
efforts were discussed in the language of rights, and though,
importantly, a parallel system of damages actions emerged

24. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding
Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1212 (2005)
(discussing how the courts have eroded remedial measures over the past
twenty-five years).
25. See id. at 1211, 1235–41.
26. Chief Justice Marshall quoted Blackstone: “‘In all other cases,’ he
says, ‘it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right,
there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded.’” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23).
27. See Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural
Injunction, 99 YALE L.J. 1983, 1983 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, pmbl., 78 Stat.
241, 241 (stating that the Act would “confer jurisdiction upon district courts of
the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in public
accommodations”).
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alongside this equity-focused system,29 the origin and structure
of civil rights jurisprudence during the Civil Rights Movement
was rooted in equity.30 “Civil rights equity” is only a strange
construction in the sense that we presume that “civil rights law”
invokes legal rights, or to the degree we think of rights in light
of the related analogy to common law rights enforcement that
“law” implies. Part I argues that civil rights are equity because
it was rooted in equity, and in its formative years, equitable
powers came to be closely associated with the civil rights project
(emerging damages actions notwithstanding).
Second, the distinction between law and equity is not
supposed to be especially meaningful in modern American law,31
making a distinction between civil rights law and civil rights
equity unclear. One should be able to speak coherently of legal
rights even if the primary remedies invoked are equitable.
Indeed, the merger of law and equity facilitated courts’ effective
confrontation of Jim Crow in the face of resistance to the Civil
Rights Movement and resistance to court-centered efforts to
eradicate Jim Crow.32 Creative utilization of equitable remedies
would evolve into the structural injunction and make public law
litigation characteristically structural reform litigation.33
Though the Supreme Court and Congress would in time curtail
these broad powers, the merger of law and equity permitted
significant judicial confrontation with Jim Crow, which made it
difficult to curtail courts’ equitable powers while confining
changes to the “equitable” aspects of civil rights litigation.34

29. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392–96
(1971) (permitting damages actions against federal officers for violations of
Fourth Amendment rights).
30. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, pmbl., 78 Stat. at 241.
31. See Samuel Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 997, 1008 (2015) [hereinafter Bray, The Supreme Court and the New
Equity].
32. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 4 (1978).
33. See Kamina Aliya Pinder, Reconciling Race-Neutral Strategies and
Race-Conscious Objectives, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 247, 250 (2013) (describing
public law litigation as lawsuits based in equity that “extends beyond the
bilateral structure to broadly impact public policy resulting in a remedy that
requires judicial activism and ongoing oversight and administration of
remedial compliance”).
34. See, e.g., Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 1213 (indicating that civil rights
litigants seeking monetary relief face court-imposed barriers to recovery).
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Civil rights equity thus represents the influence of traditional
equitable restrictions in limiting civil rights jurisprudence more
generally. Part II argues that civil rights are equity because it
has operated and continues to operate under limitations on
litigation drawn, often indirectly, from traditional equity
restrictions. The effect of these restrictions is the creation of a
hierarchy of rights that defines when to apply civil rights equity
and is defined by assumptions about what constitutes an
appropriate civil rights case, as informed by traditional
equity-based limitations on appropriate use of judicial power.
Third, the claim that civil rights are equity is peculiar
because merging law and equity created a simplified system of
attaining justice, empowering courts to pursue justice in an
efficient, consolidated process. Thus, to speak of civil rights
becoming equity defies the assumptions of the post-FRCP
approach by implying that a separate kind of equity persists.
But the radical anti-formalism of modern law has obscured the
emergence of a civil rights jurisprudence that administers legal
rights by duplicating the form and role of traditional equity.
Civil rights equity means that civil rights jurisprudence has
been fashioned to permit courts to intervene principally in
circumstances reminiscent of traditional equity courts—to
address outrages, where legal remedies are inadequate, and for
deserving litigants.35 Civil rights are made a supplement to law
with an approach that supplants legalistic constructions of
rights with a largely unbounded search for injustice as
understood by individual jurists. The unbounded nature of this
jurisprudence is also obscured because, like the jurisprudence of
traditional equity, civil rights jurisprudence is characteristically
procedural—focused on limiting litigants’ access to courts’
tremendous power to provide remedies. Yet civil rights
jurisprudence is substantively fact intensive—focusing jurists
on the specific claim of the particular individual, under their
precise circumstances.36 The efficient, consolidated pursuit of
justice in modern law has come to empower jurists to provide
35. See Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 400 (“[T]he jurisdiction of
Equity consisted entirely of cases where the legal remedies were inadequate.”).
36. See Rudovsky, supra note 24, at 1200 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has
restricted civil rights remedies through a series of complex and controversial
measures, including . . . narrower standards for standing and for private
enforcement of civil rights legislation . . . .”).
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remedies where they perceive an injustice, tested by procedural
limits, and structure cases for judicial management, checked by
the necessity of accord from appellate courts.37 Civil rights
equity is thus a search for outrages.
Accordingly, Part III argues that civil rights are equity
because it fulfills the role of traditional equity in the way
traditional equity operated. Fulfilling equity’s role in this way
is not confined to cases involving equitable remedies. Indeed,
civil rights equity is epitomized by damages actions being
restricted to the kinds of circumstances that equity practice
occupied in traditional equity systems. This is less an
application of equity restrictions to civil rights than it is an
application of popular views of equity in the legal profession to
civil rights litigation as a means of redefining the role of civil
rights. Part IV details how civil rights equity operates, and the
Conclusion summarizes some implications.
I.

EQUITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA

Civil rights are equity because the original conception of
civil rights litigation was thoroughgoingly equitable.38 The
reliance on equity in civil rights made civil rights and equitable
remedies synonymous and modeled civil rights intervention on
equity’s traditional role.39 Though a complete version of civil
rights equity would only emerge as a product of efforts since the
late 1970s to restrict civil rights actions, this original conception
of civil rights had a lasting effect on courts’ approach to rights
cases.
This Part begins with a description of equity. It then depicts
the centrality of equity to Brown v. Board of Education40 and to
the formative 1960s civil rights legislation. Equity was more
than a choice of remedy, more, even, than a necessity dictated
by the enormity of a nation confronting an aspect of its identity

37. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 32, at 6 (“The civil rights
injunction . . . invites us to imagine that the substantive claim could be just,
and to ask then whether the classical position of the injunction in the remedial
hierarchy—one of subordination—can be justified.”).
38. See FISS, supra note 32, at 4.
39. See Alex Reinert, Procedural Barriers to Civil Rights Litigation and
the Illusory Promise of Equity, 78 UMKC L. REV. 931, 946–48 (2010).
40. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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as defining as Jim Crow. Equity framed and defined the
judiciary’s role in this project as an exceptional intervention to
address an extraordinary problem. This framework would
influence future treatment of rights as the country and the
courts largely abandoned their brief confrontation with Jim
Crow’s myriad effects.41
A.

Traditional Equity, Equity as Justice, and Popular Equity

Civil rights equity is not traditional equity. It draws from,
but is independent of, equity as it used to be and as it is today.
Civil rights equity is an imitation of traditional equity and is an
expansion of those aspects of equity that remain significant
after the merger of law and equity. But equity is a slippery term,
used alternatively to refer to the legacy judicial system that
operated in parallel to common law courts in the
Anglo-American legal tradition (traditional equity) and more
broadly to reference the mission of such courts in ensuring
justice (equity as justice).42 This formal system and broad
mission animate the ways equity is used in legal discourse,
producing a third aspect of equity: informal juridical equity
(popular equity). Traditional equity, equity as justice, and
popular equity all inform civil rights equity, which is largely a
species of popular equity.
Traditional equity emerged alongside and in supplement to
the common law.43 It possessed its own, ultimately complex
system of writs, rules and precedent.44 Traditional equity was a
parallel system of Anglo-American jurisprudence, originally
administered by independent courts of equity.45 The system of

41. See FISS, supra note 32, at 4 (discussing the impact of the injunction
as its use extended to civil rights cases generally).
42. See Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 495 (“The moderating
force of equity ensures just results in each application of the strict law and also
fulfills an essential role in the dialectic evolution of the law.”).
43. Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 502.
44. See generally STORY, supra note 22.
45. “England has not had separate courts of law and equity since the
1870s.” Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, supra note 31, at 1017
(citing Patrick Polden, Part III: The Courts of Law, in 11 THE OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 523, 757–73 (John Baker ed., 2010)). In Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom the term “fusion” refers to the merger of law
and equity. Samuel L. Bray, Form and Substance in the Fusion of Law and
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equity was unevenly adopted by the colonies and early American
states due to distrust of the unbounded power it vested in
judges,46 but states widely adopted equity courts or recognized
equity in courts with dual or merged jurisdiction.47 American
courts drew on the writs, rules, and precedent of the English
Chancery Court and later on homegrown equity precedent to
adjudicate equity cases.48 Federal courts always had both legal
and equitable jurisdiction but, until the adoption of the FRCP,
administered law and equity separately, typically borrowing
state precedent and procedure under various process and
conformity acts.49
In Anglo-American law, common law and equity were
systems that successively emerged from the royal prerogative to
supplant the legal process of communal courts after the Norman
conquest.50 As common law became an independent, formalized
system of jurisprudence, equity emerged as a system for
interposing just results in cases where the common law courts
were inadequate.51 Over time, the Court of Chancery developed
into a distinct court that was a supplement and competitor to
the common law courts and whose power expanded as the
complexity of growing mercantilism exposed limitations in the
common law procedure, forms of action, and substantive rules.52

Equity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY (Dennis
Klimchuk et al. eds., 2020) [hereinafter Bray, Fusion of Law and Equity].
46. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909, 926 (1987).
47. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 95–98 (3d
ed. 2005).
48. See Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 463.
49. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 930.
50. For an examination of the history of equity jurisdiction, see Main,
Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 437.
51. See id. at 440–42. Main’s review underscores the supplemental role of
equity in providing flexibility to the “universalizing” tendency of law. See
Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 351. That flexibility is lost in a continuous
process that Main believes equity operated to counteract. Id. at 400. Civil
rights equity serves a similar purpose but rather than provide flexibility to
ensure justice, civil rights equity ensures flexibility to suppress the
development of a strict civil rights jurisprudence that would disrupt notions
about federalism and the proper role of courts.
52. See Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 442–43.
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Equity courts also transformed over time,53 eventually
operating as a complex, parallel legal system,54 even in the
United States, where equity jurisdiction was sometimes, for
example, in the federal courts, exercised by the same judges
possessing common law jurisdiction.55
Since the merger of law and equity56 in the FRCP and the
rejection of the formal pleading it included, a single system of
pleading and procedure for law and equity has governed,
obscuring the distinction between law and equity, the latter of
which is most identifiable today in specific equitable remedies.57
The jurisprudence of traditional equity was thus permitted to
inform the equitable powers deployed after Brown to administer
civil rights remedies in what would become the civil rights or
structural injunction. Some conservative commentators regard
Brown as disrupting traditional equity by interposing a
“sociological” perspective in place of an individual focus,58 but

53. Until the seventeenth century, courts of equity focused on right and
wrong with little regard for precedent in the name of conscience. Id. at 445.
Starting with Lord Chancellor Bacon, who issued one hundred rules of equity,
and continuing under subsequent Lord Chancellors, equity was “bound and
confined by the channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own
procedure.” Id. at 447–48.
54. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 918–21 (“An expansive equity practice
developed as a necessary companion to common law.”).
55. See Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, supra note 31;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 97–98 (noting that many states “handed over the
powers and tools of equity to ordinary courts of common law”).
56. The “merger” was preceded by the merger in the influential Field
Code of New York. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 293–94. Subrin argues that
the Field Code was more common-law rooted than it appeared and much more
so than the FRCP. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 925, 931–39.
57. Though equity has disappeared, save in remedies according to Bray,
Fusion of Law and Equity, supra note 45, at 2 n.5, equity arguably won out in
the FRCP, influencing the courts’ distinctly anti-formalist approach under the
FRCP. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 943–74 (explaining how equity and
common law influenced the FRCPs); FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 298 (noting
that, insofar as law and equity were joined in the FRCPs, equity “came out on
top”).
58. See GARY MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8–11 (1982)
(explaining that, because of the Brown decisions, “[e]quity, originally and
historically a power addressed toward individuals, has been stretched to cover
entire social classes”); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, at 371–72 (1990) (noting
that the balancing test under Brown II might mean “Linda Brown’s right to
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these objections seem really to be to the definition of the right to
equality under the Constitution. As one objector conceded,
Brown II’s59 use of equity was a conservative outcome,
notwithstanding how the structural injunction would be utilized
in years to come.60 Brown (I and II) initiated a civil rights
jurisprudence
characterized
by
equity’s
flexible,
forward-looking focus on achieving just outcomes.61 For one
commentator, “Brown and its legacy . . . are very good
constitutional equity.”62
However administered, traditional equity had distinctive
characteristics. Traditional Equity was supplemental to law; it
intervened only where the common law provided no “plain,
adequate, and complete remedy.”63 Traditional equity was in
personam, acting only on the individual and enforced only
through contempt power.64 In this way, equity courts avoided
conflict with common law courts that may have simultaneously
possessed jurisdiction over a dispute.65 And traditional equity
pursued justice, understood as the “moral sense of the
community.”66
prompt relief must yield to some larger but vaguely defined public interest in
balancing the claims of her protected class against the need for public order”).
59. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
60. See GRAHAM, supra note 58, at 371 (“Brown II, then, was a
conservative decision, as the relieved white South and the disappointed civil
rights community immediately perceived.” (emphasis in original)).
61. See FISS, supra note 32, at 6 (explaining that the civil rights injunction
as applied in Brown permits the courts to “look at the injunction through a
different substantive lens—a belief that the underlying claim—to achieve
equality for the racial minority—is just”).
62. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA xii (1990).
63. Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 350; see Main, Traditional
Equity, supra note 21, at 451; STORY, supra note 22, at 16.
64. Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 350.
65. See Main, Traditional Equity, supra note 21, at 451 (“Whenever a
court of law was competent to take cognizance of a right and had the power to
proceed to a judgment that afforded . . . relief, the plaintiff had to proceed at
law because . . . the defendant had a right . . . available only in the law
courts.”).
66. “Intervention was premised on the notion that justice incorporated
the moral sense of the community, existing as a function not only of a
community’s technical rules but also of ‘magisterial good sense, unhampered
by rule . . . .’” Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 351 (citing Roscoe Pound,
Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 701–02 (1913)). Traditional
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Significantly, these attributes of traditional equity operated
in concert with law and were interdependent with law.67
Equity’s role in doing justice derives from the inadequacies of
law.68 Equity intervened when legal outcomes were inconsistent
with the community’s conscience reflected through the
Chancellor.69 As Justice Story noted, the guiding principle of
equity was the justice of the common law, making equity
“sometimes concurrent,” “sometimes exclusive,” and “sometimes
auxiliary” to the common law.70 Equity responded to
inadequacies in law:
The remedy must have been plain; for if it be doubtful and
obscure at law, equity will assert a jurisdiction. . . . It must
have been adequate; for if at law it falls short of what the
party is entitled to, that founds a jurisdiction in equity. And
it must have been complete; that is, it must attain the full
end and justice of the case. It must have reached the whole
mischief and secure the whole right of the party in a perfect
manner at the present time and in future; otherwise equity
will interfere and give such relief and aid as the exigency of
the particular case may require. The jurisdiction of a court of
equity was, therefore, sometimes concurrent with the
jurisdiction of a court of law, it was sometimes exclusive of
it, and it was sometimes auxiliary to it.71

Where equity did intervene: equity’s in personam nature
suppressed the formation of precedent; its search for a plain,
adequate, and complete remedy at law avoided interference with
common law; and its emphasis on justice counseled hesitation
where the outcome of a decision in equity was less than clearly
in service of community notions of right.72 Equity thus counseled

equity served as a check on the universalizing tendency of law, focusing on the
specific case to convey the conscience of the community. See id.; Subrin, supra
note 46, at 918.
67. For a review of the debate over whether and to what extent equity
interfered with the Common Law or abated its rigors, see Main, New Equity,
supra note 20, at 370 n.196.
68. See id. at 351.
69. See id. at 370 (“[T]he very purpose of a separate system was to correct
or to mitigate injustices caused by the rigor of the common law.”).
70. STORY, supra note 22, at 20.
71. Id. at 19–20 (internal citations omitted).
72. Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 371.
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public interest balancing to obtain a just result.73 Traditional
equity’s intervention power is consequently more limited than it
might have seemed.74 Traditional equity was dynamic,
operating in a dialectical relationship with law and dependent
on it.75
However, in the United States, the merger of law and equity
has largely limited our discussion of equity to remedies and,
because equity is no longer working as a supplement to the
common law, rendered equity static, rigid, and mostly
overlooked.76 But the merger also had liberating effects. It
permitted courts to tailor unique remedies that fit the right
violated without worrying about procedural, substantive, or

73. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law,
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1780
(1991) (“Frequently the availability of equitable remedies depended, at least
in part, on a balancing calculus structured to reconcile public and private
needs.”).
74. As Main elaborates:
Equity did not claim to override the law. By acting in personam,
Equity could compel a person to perform a duty without directly
challenging or altering the defendant’s property rights and without
regard to any contrary judgment rendered in the Law courts.
“Equity” does not intend to set aside what is right and
just, nor does it try to pass judgment on a “strict Common
Law rule” by claiming that the latter is not well made. It
merely states that, in the interest of a truly effective and
fair administration of Justice, the “strict Common Law”
is not to be observed in some particular instance.
Moreover, Equity’s decision had no precedential effect even in
Equity, much less in Law. [Nor did] Equity [seek to] correct all
injustices. In fact, Equity left untouched, in full force and operation,
a great number of legal rules that were certainly harsh, unjust, and
unconscientious as any of those that it did confront.
Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 371–72 (quoting Anton Hermann
Chroust, The “Common Good” and the Problem of “Equity” in the Philosophy
of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 114, 117 (1942)).
75. See Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 375 (“As complements and
as rivals, separate systems of Law and Equity combined to administer the laws
for centuries with both certainty and discretion.”).
76. See id. at 387 (“For in denying Equity any structural autonomy, there
remains no relief from the procedures of the merged system itself when the
modes of proceeding in that system are inadequate. Thus when the
unanticipated situation arises, courts have no choice but to follow the
procedural rules drafted . . . .”).
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remedial limitations on that substantive right.77 This element of
the merger facilitated the Supreme Court’s Brown outcome,
even if worries remained about the lack of a remedy for the
individual plaintiffs in the case.78 Though the power invoked by
courts during the civil rights period was an awesome and broad
power, it was limited: it was an exceptional intervention,
justified by exceptional circumstances, and acting on deserving
individuals.79
This exceptional role for courts in extraordinary
circumstances was justified by another aspect of equity: its
pursuit of justice. Equity is more than the jurisprudential legacy
of traditional equity.80 Equity has long meant justice,
independent of the elaborate systems of traditional equity and
equitable remedies.81 This broad sense of equity is rooted in the
humanities and traces at least to Aristotle in the Western
tradition.82 Geared toward counterbalancing the rigidity of legal
77. According to Subrin, “Pound contended that substantive and
procedural common law concentrated too heavily on the individual and private
rights, thus neglecting the importance of the community and the need for
government protection of the individual.” Subrin, supra note 46, at 945 (citing
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 403–04 (1906)). This dissatisfaction underlay
the efforts to reform procedure and led to the FRCP, which Subrin sees as
particularly equity influenced. Subrin argues that the desire to permit judges
to do justice was a defining feature of the emergence of the FRCP (and a
departure from the Field Code), thus characterizing those rules. Subrin, supra
note 46, at 943–74.
78. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 933 (“Civil rights cases challenging
segregation were never about compensatory damages . . . . On this account,
the Court . . . has accepted a vision of public interest law in which damages
litigation is seen as less productive, less virtuous, and less admirable than
equitable cases.”).
79. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 46, at 926 (classifying Brown as a
“structural case[] that attempt[s] to re-interpret constitutional rights in light
of experience and evolving norms of what is humanitarian”).
80. See GARY WATT, EQUITY STIRRING: THE STORY OF JUSTICE BEYOND LAW
36 (2009) (outlining the various contextual uses of equity, including social
justice, equality of opportunity and resources, and fair wealth distribution).
81. See generally id.
82. See id. at 36–41. The typical cite is to ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 143 (J. H.
Freese trans., 1926) (“For that which is equitable seems to be just, and equity
is justice that goes beyond the written law.”). Accord ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 313 (H. Rackham trans., 1926) (“We have next to speak
of Equity and the equitable, and of their relation to Justice and to what is just
respectively.”).
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rules with a focus on the situation of the individual, equity
pursues just results characterized by flexibility (over
uniformity), specificity (over abstraction), and particularity
(over generality).83 This focus on the justice of outcomes has
unsurprisingly informed traditional equity and the
jurisprudence developed in its service.84 Equity as justice also
contributes to understandings of the good life, recognition,
liberty, and other ideas associated with justice in political and
social theory.85 This broad sense of equity as justice animates
the key substantive role of civil rights—remedying injustice.
The pursuit of justice gave weight to the Court’s
Civil-Rights-Movement-era
jurisprudential
developments,
charging courts to get the outcome right and justifying the
creative use of equitable remedies that became the structural
injunction. That civil rights jurisprudence today might be seen
as failing to address the social and political issues traditionally
associated with the Civil Rights Movement ought not be taken
as an abandonment of a justice-seeking mission. Quite the
contrary, civil rights jurisprudence has been reduced to almost
exclusively pursuing this kind of broad justice but does so in the
exceptional, supplemental way associated with the mission of
traditional equity.86 In routine cases, where injustice does not
strongly resonate with jurists, the civil rights equity that has
emerged points courts away from intervening; nonetheless, civil
rights’s mission remains the pursuit of justice.
Equity today also operates in the popular legal imagination.
Popular equity is an informal view of equity invoked by jurists
who draw on concepts established by traditional equity and use
it in professional legal discourse. It is “popular” in that it is
independent of the details of traditional equity jurisprudence,
83. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 918 (“Bills in equity were written to
persuade the Chancellor to relieve the petitioner from an alleged injustice that
would result from rigorous application of the common law.”).
84. See Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 386 (“One virtue
of . . . Equity was its authority to act in opposition to the strict law when the
unique circumstances of a particular case demanded intervention.”).
85. See id. at 344–45.
86. See MCDOWELL, supra note 58, at 97–98 (“By ignoring the
particularity of each case, the Court could confine its attention to what it saw
as the unifying ‘legal question’ all of the [Brown] cases shared: the meaning of
equal protection of the laws and, accordingly, the meaning of equality under
the Constitution.”).
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reflecting foundational concepts from equity but disconnected
from and unconstrained by its details.87 This popular equity
envisions equity as a supplement to law, available only where
legal remedies are inadequate to achieve justice, and only for
deserving claimants. These concepts are embedded in
prerequisites to invoking equitable remedies88 and have
something of a phantom presence in contemporary legal
discourse.89 After the merger of law and equity, these
prerequisites are seldom taught separately from remedies and,

87. Main identifies three usages of the term equity that roughly
correspond with those I have set out here. First, is the use of equity as that
which is “ethical rather than jural” and focuses on what is “moral, right, just
and good.” Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at 344. This is like the
equity-as-justice construction put forth here. Second, Main notes that equity
is associated with “natural justice,” conveying “the soul and spirit of all
law— the moral standard to which all law should conform.” Id. at 344–45
(internal quotation omitted). And third, Main speaks of the “technical
definition of Equity (a meaning typically signified by use of the capital letter
‘E’) [which] refers to that system of jurisprudence that was originally
administered by the High Court of Chancery in England,” and whose
emergence Main details in two works. Id. at 345–46; see id. at 346–53
(comparing Equity to the emergence and goals of ADR); Main, Traditional
Equity, supra note 21, at 437–52 (detailing Equity’s emergence and
juxtaposing it with the Common Law. Main’s third version of equity (Equity)
corresponds to the traditional equity referenced in this Article; however, his
second sense of equity does not have a close corollate with those used in this
Article. While Main’s second version of equity is not dissimilar from the
popular juridical equity discussed here, Main’s construction seems more like a
normative check on the operation of law that is substantively like his first
equity and, generally perhaps, operates through his third, more formal,
version of equity. I believe there is an intermediary version of equity operating
(juridical or popular equity) that combines both notions of justice and aspects
of the traditional system of equity but in an informal way, despite being done
by lawyers, judges, and commentators. It is less a normative claim about how
law ought to operate than a reference to a jurisprudential system that is said
to be extant and which is sometimes controlling in disputes.
88. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103, 105, 109,
111– 13 (1983) (treating equitable requirements as stricter than the general
case-or-controversy requirement); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)
(same).
89. See MCDOWELL, supra note 58, at 100 (“[T]hough [Warren] spoke of
the ‘traditional attributes’ and guiding ‘principles’ of equity as being
controlling, he ignored most of the more substantial equitable principles in
writing his decree [in Brown II].”).
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outside of remedies, are generally no longer systematically
examined in jurisprudence and scholarship.90
Civil rights equity is a kind of popular equity, drawing on
equitable concepts, especially constraints on the invocation of
equity jurisdiction, to limit civil rights litigation. Focused on
judicial restraint, civil rights equity preserves the possibility of
judicial intervention in the interest of justice while working to
achieve the restraining goals associated with equity. Yet,
unmoored from the strictures of traditional equity, these goals
are immanent and go unexamined.
B.

The Defining Role of Equity in the Creation of Modern
Civil Rights

Civil rights are typically styled “civil rights law” because
civil rights are generally thought to be legal rights, recognized
by courts and conceived as comparable to private rights such as
property rights, rights created by contract, or rights to recover
for injuries caused by the fault of others. The suggestion that
civil rights are equity implies that “civil rights law” assumes too
much about how civil rights have been treated in American
courts. An examination of the emergence of civil rights during
the Civil Rights Movement highlights that the promise of a
property-like rights regime was never unequivocal and possibly
never predominant.91 Rights recognition and enforcement,
especially as related to efforts to dismantle Jim Crow, were
always heavily rooted in the federal judiciary’s equitable
powers, and private rights of action for monetary (legal) relief,
though widely recognized by courts, were not clearly spelled out
in the signature civil rights statutes and never independent of

90. Cf. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 530, 530 (2016) [hereinafter Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies]
(explaining that there is a popular academic contention “that every distinctive
feature that is claimed for equity, such as a high degree of discretion or an
emphasis on fairness, can be found to the same degree in law”).
91. See, e.g., Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“These cases call for the
exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power.”); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“If school authorities
fail in their affirmative obligations under [Brown I and II], judicial authority
may be invoked. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a
district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad . . . .”).
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the possibility of equity relief.92 That civil rights enforcement
was always so flexible and conditioned likely obscured the
emergence of civil rights equity, as the approaches that
characterize civil rights equity were always prominent in civil
rights jurisprudence.
Civil rights have promised to provide protection to the core
values of American citizenship by treating constitutional and
statutory rights as the equivalent of private rights,93 the
infringement of which suggests the need for remedies to make
the holder of the right whole.94 Despite a proliferation of
Reconstruction Era Amendments and legislation, the
Reconstruction Era courts suppressed emergence of a rights
regime by holding that the Reconstruction constitutional
amendments established few relevant rights.95 This is especially
true of the Supreme Court’s insistence that the privileges and
immunities of American citizenship referenced by the
Fourteenth Amendment meant little.96 Similarly, the Court
read the statutory rights created under the authority of these
amendments as either beyond the authority the amendments

92. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 206, 78 Stat.
241, 245 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5) (empowering the Attorney General
to bring civil actions “requesting such preventative relief . . . necessary to
insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described”).
93. Courts have occasionally emphasized the “rights” character of civil
rights. Recently in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the
Supreme Court rejected “interest-balancing” as an appropriate approach to
interpreting the Second Amendment, referencing the First Amendment for
support. Id. at 634–35. At least for those two constitutional rights, the Court
speaks of commands limiting the government’s authority to act. See McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). “The Bill of Rights enshrines
negative liberties. It directs what government may not do to its citizens, rather
than what it must do for them.” Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v. Walker, 705
F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2013); see Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353,
358 (2009) (stating that the First Amendment operates as a negative restraint
on governmental regulation of speech).
94. This view dates back to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 73, at 1778 (“Few principles of the American
constitutional tradition resonate more strongly than one stated in Marbury v.
Madison: for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy.”).
95. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
96. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76–77 (1872).
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granted or as lacking in substantive force.97 This is Eugene
Gressman’s “unhappy history” of civil rights law.98
Modern courts confronted these questions anew in the
1950s and 1960s. Though the courts and Congress embraced a
vision of rights as enforceable attributes of citizenship and as
necessary attributes of the equality that civil rights advocates
were seeking, their approach, at least in actions supporting the
Civil Rights Movement, relied on the judiciary’s equitable
powers. Brown and congressional enactments alike emphasized
courts’ equitable powers.99 Brown expressly rejected the
then-contemporary construction, “personal and present right,”
that the Court had underscored in Sweatt v. Painter100 and
which would have triggered access to money damages.101
Instead, Brown turns on the judiciary’s equity powers.102
Similarly, private rights of action were not clearly emphasized
and actions for damages are almost entirely absent in the 1960s
civil rights statutes.103 And though Supreme Court decisions
recognized private rights of action to enforce constitutional
rights as legal rights after Brown,104 the judicial and legislative
legacy related to the Civil Rights Movement evidences a

97. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (striking down
several provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
98. See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952).
99. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (“These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power.”); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, § 206, 78 Stat. 241, 245 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5)
(empowering the Attorney General to seek equitable relief to prevent
violations of the Act).
100. 339 U.S. 629 (1950); id. at 635.
101. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR.,
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL
SEGREGATION CASES 161 (1957).
102. See Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
103. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 206, 78 Stat. 241,
245 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5) (contemplating equitable relief).
104. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (permitting
damages suits against state officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (permitting implied
damages actions against federal officers); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S.
677, 717 (1979) (recognizing implied damages actions to enforce federal
statutory rights in some circumstances).
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reticence to foster a private law-like-entitlement view of civil
rights.
1.

Brown and 1960s Civil Rights Statutes’ Focus on
Empowering Courts and the Attorney General

In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),105 the Supreme
Court famously overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,106 declaring that
separate but equal public education programs violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.107 Notably,
the decision avoided announcing a remedy. The Court reheard
the question of remedies and declared in Brown II that
desegregation should proceed “with all deliberate speed.”108
Brown II expressly relied on equity:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has
been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its
remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the
personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public
schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis.
To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a
variety of obstacles in making the transition to school
systems operated in accordance with the constitutional
principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision.109

Under Brown II, school desegregation proceeded slowly in the
face of “massive resistance” in the South,110 not to mention the
nagging implication by many that Brown I was wrongly

105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
107. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
108. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
109. Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted); see BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note
101, at 158–79. Hoffer details the Court’s complex and “ambitious” efforts to
“fuse a very technical conception of equitable discretion based on the Balance
of Equity doctrine with Warren’s highly personal vision of equitable
discretion.” HOFFER, supra note 62, 180–90.
110. See generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS
(2004).
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decided,111 and despite the agreement among the Court and all
litigants that the “all deliberate speed” injunction was within
the Court’s powers.112
Looking back at this complicated, politically charged
context, it is perhaps easy to see Brown as establishing legal
rights113 and miss its overt reliance on federal courts’ equitable
powers, which, at the time at least, vested courts with
tremendous authority to order demounting of our segregated
system.114 Perhaps as importantly, the Court’s approach also
seemed to set out a framework that would define civil rights
going forward: the Court was departing from “law” to achieve a
just outcome by responding to an outrage (Jim Crow
segregation), where normal legal remedies were inadequate115
(the recurrent argument that Plessy was correctly decided but
morally wrong), in a way that was extraordinary (education
policy being generally left to states), and for deserving
complainants (innocent schoolchildren).116
Contemporaneous commentators saw Brown this way.
After a long discussion of the need for neutral principles,
Herbert Wechsler’s article, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, criticized the Brown opinion for being

111. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959); Alexander Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1955).
112. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 101, at 162–67. The NAACP
requested the plaintiffs’ immediate admission to segregated schools. Id. at
165–66.
113. See Robert A. Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public
Schools—1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377, 425–26 (1954) (exploring potential
damages, such as monetary and criminal penalties against perpetrators of
segregation, as remedies for school segregation). This view of Brown is
summarized in Reinert, supra note 39, at 946–48.
114. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 946 (“[T]he Court is consolidating its
power. And moving civil rights litigation into the equitable camp is one way of
doing so, because equity is controlled by judges.”)
115. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 101, at 162 (“[Brown] had to
invoke equity or chancery power of the courts to obtain the desired relief.”).
116. See id. at 162–63 (“In making its decree, the court of equity fashions
its remedy. It gives direct orders to litigating parties. It may also impose
conditions on their duty to obey.”).
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unprincipled.117 Wechsler supported the outcome of the
decision,118 and dismissed the significance of most criticisms of
the Brown opinion,119 giving his charge more weight. Similarly,
Alexander Bickel took up the legislative history question that
Brown avoided, concluding that the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not support Brown’s position.120 Together, the
opinions of influential scholars who nonetheless supported the
outcome of the decision cemented a view of Brown as a morally
necessary departure from normal constitutionalism—that is, an
equity-like departure from constraining legal doctrine in the
interest of justice.121 Beyond Brown II’s reliance on equitable
powers, the two Brown decisions duplicated the structure of
traditional equity in this way, a structure that would become
civil rights equity when federal courts’ equitable powers were
curtailed.
Congressional enactments continued down this path. In a
series of major enactments, Congress sought to respond to the
demands of the Civil Rights Movement activists as the
movement simultaneously gained steam and splintered.122 In
those enactments, Congress identified new rights but was at
best unclear on structuring those rights as enforceable,
property-like entitlements. In fact,
Congress’s first response to the imperative of racial equality
entailed in Brown was not to enunciate substantive rights,
but rather to authorize the Attorney General to bring
injunctive suits to implement the Fifteenth Amendment.
This occurred in the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The very next
congressional initiative, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, was in

117. See Wechsler, supra note 111, at 32–33 (stating that Brown’s outcome
required looking into the legislature’s motivations, which courts typically
cannot consider).
118. See id. at 27.
119. Id. at 31–34.
120. See Bickel, supra note 111, at 58–59, 64–65.
121. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 101, at 162 (explaining that
financial remuneration was “obviously” not an adequate remedy for Brown’s
plaintiffs).
122. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 58 (1985) (describing how
violent responses to Martin Luther King Jr.’s peaceful protests led John F.
Kennedy to send a civil rights bill to Congress).
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large part intended to perfect the Attorney General’s
injunctive weaponry on behalf of voting rights.123

Describing the situation prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 and the debates that led to it, Judge John
Minor Wisdom emphasized the central role of equitable
remedies in Congress’s efforts to overcome widely acknowledged
impediments to protecting civil rights activists.
In the field of civil rights the problem of enforcement is more
difficult than the problem of legislative definition. The choice
of remedy determines whether an act of Congress simply
declares a right or carries machinery for meaningful
performance of the statutory promise. In the past, an obvious
hiatus has been the lack of effective sanctions against
private persons interfering with a citizen’s exercise of a civil
right. This lack may be explained by a number of reasons. (a)
Congress has been reluctant to assert affirmatively by
legislation its responsibility to protect the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, for fear of
imperiling the balanced relationship between the states and
the Nation. (b) Courts have narrowly construed criminal
sanctions available in Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18. (c)
Congress and the courts have been severely limited by the
doctrine of state action, in spite of the trend toward an
expansive view of what is state action. (d) Congress has been
wary of using an equitable remedy in civil rights legislation.
The Constitution guarantees an accused in a criminal case
the right to indictment by a grand jury and trial by a jury of
the vicinage. Enforcement of civil rights through the use of
an injunction and the contempt power of the courts would
by-pass the jury system. However, in communities hostile to
civil rights and resentful against ‘outside’, that is, federal
interference, injunctive relief may be the most effective
method of enforcing civil rights.
Congress considered the pros and cons of these and many
other issues when the Administration submitted an omnibus
civil rights bill in 1956. The focal issues—the contempt
power, the jury system, and the relationship of the States
with the Nation—produced one of the great debates in
American parliamentary history. By the time the bill was cut
123. FISS, supra note 32, at 21 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No.
85-315, § 131(c), 71 Stat. 634, 637; Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,
§ 601, 74 Stat. 86, 90–91.

1916

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1889 (2022)

down to a voting rights law, as the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
71 Stat. 634, Congress and the country thoroughly
understood the significance of the legislation. Congress had
opened the door, then nearly shut, to national responsibility
for protecting civil rights—created or guaranteed by the
Nation—by injunction proceedings against private
persons.124

Wisdom’s recitation tellingly never considers civil actions for
damages (legal actions) as a means to address the civil rights
challenge.125 In the Civil Rights Act of 1957, he saw the
beginning of an effective legislative assault on Jim Crow
through expansion of equity power.126
In the Civil Rights Act of 1964,127 Congress broadly banned
discrimination in public accommodations128 and public
facilities,129 by recipients of federal funds,130 and in
employment.131 Beginning with that Act, Congress either did not
set out an enforcement mechanism or created systems that
combined administrative review and judicial actions for
124. United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp.
330, 344–46 (E.D. La. 1965) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
125. See id. at 345 (“[I]n communities hostile to civil rights and resentful
against . . . federal interference, injunctive relief may be the most effective
method of enforcing civil rights.”).
126. See id. at 349.
127. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
128. Id. § 201, 78 Stat. at 243–245.
129. Id. § 301, 78 Stat. at 246.
130. Id. § 601, 78 Stat. at 252.
131. Id. § 701, 78 Stat. at 253–255. The Act also protected voting rights,
amending the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to prevent persons acting under color of
state law from using ad hoc standards to determine a person’s qualification to
vote, denying the right to vote because of immaterial errors in the voter’s
registration record, or employing literacy tests as a qualification for voting in
designated circumstances. Id. § 101, 78 Stat. at 241–242. It addressed
desegregation of public education in Title IV, id. § 401, 78 Stat. at 246–249;
created the Commission on Civil Rights in Title V, id. § 501, 78 Stat. at
249– 252; provided for the collection of data on voter registration in Title VIII,
id. § 801, 78 Stat. at 266; provided a procedure for appeal after remand of civil
rights cases that had been removed to federal court and for the intervention of
the Attorney General in civil rights cases in Title IX, id. § 901, 78 Stat. at
266– 67; and created a Community Relations Service in Title X, id. § 1001, 78
Stat. at 267. The bulk of the Act (thirteen of the Act’s twenty-eight pages) was
devoted to Title VII, id. § 701, 78 Stat. at 253–266, but most of the attention
in the debates was directed to Title II, id. § 201, 78 Stat. at 243–246.

CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY

1917

equitable relief.132 For Title VI, where Congress did not provide
a judicial remedy, one could reasonably have anticipated that
the various agencies distributing federal funds might provide
enforcement.133 But for Title II, the provision banning
discrimination in public accommodations about which most of
the debate on the Act focused, such enforcement would make no
sense, as there were no agencies with authority over the wide
range of public accommodations implicated by the Act.134 To
address this, the Title anticipated an equitable action by the
aggrieved party and was titled, “Injunctive Relief Against
Discrimination in Places of Public Accommodation.”135 In fact,
132. See id. §§ 301–308, 78 Stat. at 246 (failing to provide a remedy).
133. In fact, that is what the Title calls for: federal departments and
agencies are directed to issue “rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability” to achieve the objectives of the Act—elimination of
discrimination on the basis of race color or national origin—and compliance
with such requirements “may be effected (1) by the termination of” funding so
long as “there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement” and after voluntary
efforts to achieve compliance have failed. Id. § 602, 78 Stat. at 252–293; see
Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Title VI
enforcement procedures apply to the Board’s teacher hiring and assignment
practices and . . . HEW therefore had jurisdiction to investigate and seek
compliance.”). The Supreme Court assumed that Congress intended a private
right of action for damages to be available under Title VI, see Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 696 (1979) (stating that Title IX was
modeled after Title VI, and that Title VI had “been construed as creating a
private remedy”), a view confirmed by Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service
Commission, 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983) (explaining that the private cause of
action from Title VI was not expressly created by Congress but implied by the
courts).
134. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201(b)(1)–(4), 78 Stat. at 243
(explaining that inns, hotels, motels, restaurants, lunchrooms, movie theaters,
and sports stadiums, among others, fall under the Act).
135. Id. § 204, 78 Stat. at 243–44. The enforcement anticipated was “a civil
action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or
temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order” by the “person
aggrieved,” id. § 204(a), 78 Stat. at 244, and “a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of the costs” for the prevailing party, id. § 204(b), 78 Stat. at 244.
Tellingly, the constitutionality of the Act, was tested not by efforts to enforce
the Act but by declaratory judgment and injunctive actions brought by
supporters of segregation in public accommodations seeking to have the Act
declared unconstitutional. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 305
(1964) (“We find it in no violation of any express limitations of the Constitution
and we therefore declare it valid.”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964) (“The appellant contends that Congress in
passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate commerce . . . .”).
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Title II excluded other presumably legal remedies like
damages.136 Congress’s actions in Title VII, the employment
discrimination provision, raised even more questions. Right
before the bill passed out of the House Judiciary Committee, a
NLRB-like EEOC with adjudicatory powers was replaced with
the current version.137 Senators then added the private right of
action, replacing a remedial structure that was primarily
administrative with a hybrid one that required administrative
“conciliation” efforts but permitted lawsuits by individuals.138
While this version gives preference to private litigation over
administrative enforcement, the private suits authorized by
Title VII provided only “equitable” relief.139
If rights create a form of property, the enforcement of such
rights in various parts of Congress’s signature civil rights
enactment were administrative (Title VI), unclear (Title III),140
136. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 205, 78 Stat. at 244–45. While it is arguably
hard to anticipate the consequential damages one might encounter from being
excluded from, say, an ice cream shop, even on a hot day, segregation extended
to essential services like hospitals, where the damages caused by exclusion
were already extant. See Cara A. Fauci, Racism and Health Care in America:
Legal Responses to Racial Disparities in the Allocation of Kidneys, 21 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 39–40 (2001) (explaining how segregation of medical
services harmed Black people during the Jim Crow Era).
137. See Chuck Henson, Title VII Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2
U. MIA. RACE & SOC. JUS. L. REV. 41, 72–74 (2012) (“The Judiciary Committee
stripped out the judicial function entirely. All that remained was the
Commission’s ability to seek judicial relief for discrimination when conciliation
failed.”); WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 122, at 58 (“Title VII (Equal
Employment) was retained, but the commission’s powers were limited to
investigation and conciliation.”).
138. See Henson, supra note 137, at 83.
139. Section 706 sets out the administrative process precedent to a suit,
permitting “a civil action . . . brought against the respondent named in the
charge” filed with the EEOC or state agency by the aggrieved party. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260. If a court finds an unlawful
employment practice, “the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate,” including “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay,” id. § 706(g), 78 Stat. at 261, along with a reasonable
attorney’s fee, id. § 706(k), 78 Stat. at 261.
140. Title III empowered the Attorney General to bring an action when
individuals were denied access to public facilities (other than schools and
public colleges) on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, for “such
relief as may be appropriate.” Id. § 301(a), 78 Stat. at 246. Title III is unclear
because in Section 303 it reserves the prospect of suit by “any person” for such
exclusion. Id. § 303, 78 Stat. at 246.
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complex (Titles II and VII), and in all cases, “equitable” rather
than “legal.”141 Courts would quickly recognize private rights of
action to enforce Titles II and IV, but even for those causes,
equitable remedies seemed to be the primary focus. Indeed, soon
after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court embraced
private litigation as an important aspect of successful
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, while casting doubt
on damages actions as an appropriate way to be a “private
attorney general.”142
The Voting Rights Act of 1965143 concerned issues of grave
importance to the activists of the Civil Rights Movement, which
they believed would grant them significant political power in the
many jurisdictions in the South where activism was most
focused.144 One might have expected it to create clear,
enforceable individual rights. At the same time, the Act involved
voting systems that are varied, complex, and typically controlled
by state and local governments, suggesting the Act would create
a regulatory regime. Unsurprisingly, the Act’s structure
contains a mixture of individual rights combined with

141. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 932 (stating that the Court has crafted
equitable or injunctive relief in civil rights litigation rather than legal or
monetary relief).
142. “When a plaintiff brings an action under that Title [II], he cannot
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone
but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.” Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
143. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973)
(current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301). References to the Voting Rights Act
here are to the earlier designation. The Voting Rights Act’s operation was
limited to five years, necessitating reauthorization. Extensions in 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 315 (1970); 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975);
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982); and 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246,
120 Stat. 580 (2006), imported significant substantive changes to the Act, often
to reverse narrow judicial interpretations. The last two reauthorizations were
for twenty-five years each.
144. Consequently, voting rights were the subject of the Civil Rights Acts
of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b), and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(e), and were protected in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(a)(2)(A)–(C). Together, these Acts prohibited intimidation intended to
interfere with the right to vote. See, e.g., United States v. Original Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 347–49 (E.D. La. 1965). Remedies under
these statutes are specifically equitable. See United States v. Ramsey, 331
F.2d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 1964).
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regulations on jurisdictions setting voting rules and
qualifications.145 Along with the Twenty-Fourth Amendment
that, in 1964, prohibited the poll tax, the Voting Rights Act’s
Section 2 constructed the right to vote as a valuable right to be
protected:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color . . . .146

The Voting Rights Act—like the Civil Rights Act of 1964—was
perhaps surprisingly equivocal on how this right was to be
enforced. The statute provided criminal penalties for violating
the Act and a supervisory structure with Federal Examiners in
certain jurisdictions as well as poll watchers.147 But the Act
refers again and again to the Attorney General bringing
injunctive or declaratory judgment actions to enforce various
provisions of the Act.148 The language of the Act focuses on
actors engaged in prohibited behavior and actions by the
Attorney General to stop the illegal behavior without
referencing individual beneficiaries of the Act.149 The Act’s
“right” seems to stop short of providing individually enforceable
property-like entitlements to vote.
Section 3, the general enforcement provision of the Act, is a
broad grant of authority to the Attorney General to proceed
“under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendment.”150 Changes in voting rules

145. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 7(b), 79 Stat. at 440 (describing
eligible voters); id. § 4, 79 Stat. at 438 (explaining types of banned tests in
determining eligible voters).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
147. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302.
148. Id.
149. See id. § 10302(b).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a)). Section 4
similarly provided enforcement authority to the Attorney General to enforce
the Section’s prohibition on voting tests. Id. § 1973(b) (transferred to 52 U.S.C.
§ 10303). Subsection (b) of this Section has been held unconstitutional. See
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013) (stating that the Section
violates the fundamental constitutional principle of equal sovereignty among
states).
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required preclearance under the Act’s Section 5,151 and the
Court would soon acknowledge that private individuals could
seek equitable and declaratory relief to block new voting
requirements in violation of Section 5.152 This right of action
extended to Section 2 enforcement, but the text of that Section
both creates an individual right (no voting rules can deny or
abridge “the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or
color”153) and anticipates that the Attorney General will enforce

151. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (transferred to 52 § 10304(a)). The power of
Section 5 has been rendered inoperative by the holding that Section 4 was
unconstitutional. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 (“Our country has
changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress
must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to
current conditions.”).
152. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557 (1969)
(concluding it is consistent with the purpose of the Act to allow private citizens
to seek judicial enforcement of Section 5). The court in Allen described the
confusion around the issue:
Section 12(f) of the Act . . . provides: ‘The district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction of proceedings instituted
pursuant to this section and shall exercise the same without regard
to whether a person asserting rights under the provisions of this Act
shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that
may be provided by law.
Appellants have argued this section necessarily implies that
private parties may bring suit under the Act, relying on the
language “a person.” While this argument has some force, the
question is not free from doubt, since the specific references
throughout the other subsections of § 12 are to the Attorney
General. E.g., §§ 12(d) and 12(e). However, we find merit in the
argument that the specific references to the Attorney General were
included to give the Attorney General power to bring suit to enforce
what might otherwise be viewed as “private” rights.
In any event, there is certainly no specific exclusion of private
actions. Section 12(f) is at least compatible with 28 U.S.C. § 1343
and might be viewed as authorizing private actions.
Id. at 555 n.18 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In any event, the
continued viability of such an implied right is called into doubt by the Court’s
recent, more restrictive view of implied rights of action. Cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (raising doubts about the continuing viability of
implying rights of action in Bivens suits).
153. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). The Supreme Court casts doubt on the private
right for Section 2, stating that it was “[a]ssuming, for present purposes, that
there exists a private right of action to enforce this statutory provision.” City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). But the Court mooted the question
by holding that Section 2 was coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment. Id.
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that right through equitable remedies (injunction and
declaratory judgment).154 Like the 1964 Act, the Voting Rights
Act seems to create rights but provides a complex enforcement
structure that is as much equitable as legal and centers on
protecting voting rights as much as it lends voting rights
property-like character. The private right of action recognized
by courts was as much an avenue to invoking the Court’s
considerable equitable powers as a recognition of any
property-like rights.
Congress’s other major legislative effort in response to the
Civil Rights Movement, the Fair Housing Act of 1968,155 is even
more complex. The Act, which prohibits discrimination in
various aspects of the sale and rental of housing,156 echoes the
1964 Civil Rights Act. First, like Title VI of the 1964 Act, its
definition of substantive scope extends the Act, upon passage, to
entities receiving federal funds.157 Second, it roughly duplicates
the enforcement structure of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act: the Act charges the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to receive complaints (Section 810(a)) and to
conduct investigations and lead conciliation efforts, subject to an

at 61. Bolden was legislatively overruled, eliminating the intent requirement
imposed on Section 2 by this reading and permitting suits premised on
discriminatory effect of voting regulations. See Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 131. The Court has subjected these
suits to a “totality of the circumstances” test. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30, 43 (1986). One commentator has noted, “Interestingly, § 2 does not
expressly confer a right of action, though the Supreme Court has routinely
allowed private enforcement of this provision.” Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights
and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44
IND. L. REV. 113, 138 n.198 (2010) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997
(1994); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)).
154. Though a declaratory judgment is not strictly an equitable remedy, it
operates much like the injunction to which it is tied here. Samuel L. Bray, The
Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1143 (2014).
155. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81.
156. Id. §§ 804–806, 82 Stat. at 83–84. The prohibitions on discrimination
are subject to exemptions for religious organizations and private clubs, id.
§ 807, 82 Stat. at 84; for bona fide private sales of private dwellings, id.
§ 803(b)(1), 82 Stat. at 82; and for sales and rentals of units in small,
multifamily housing facilities occupied by the owner, id. § 803(b)(2), 82 Stat.
at 83.
157. Id. § 803(a)(1)(A)–(D), 82 Stat. at 82. The Act went into effect for other
housing on December 31, 1968. Id. § 803(a)(2), 82 Stat. at 82.
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obligation to defer to existing state or local procedures;158 it
charges the Secretary to use “informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion;”159 and, if the Secretary’s efforts do
not resolve the dispute, it permits “persons aggrieved” to file a
civil action in federal district court “to enforce the rights granted
or protected” by the Act.160
In enacting of the Fair Housing Act, Congress created a
mixed remedial system with both legal and equitable attributes.
Section 810(d) emphasizes that in a private suit under the Act161
a “court may . . . enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
[discriminatory] practice or order such affirmative action as may
be appropriate.”162 But Section 812(c), which sets out the
remedies available in such an action, authorizes both equitable
and legal remedies, along with costs and fees for prevailing
plaintiffs.163
The Fair Housing Act seems to reflect the merger of law and
equity in a context in which Congress expects private litigation
to drive enforcement of the Act, subject to administrative efforts
to head off litigation that are designed to permit the Secretary
to obtain necessary information to educate the public (Sections
808 and 809).164 The Attorney General is authorized to bring
pattern and practice suits in a companion Section165 but the
Act’s enforcement is built around private litigation with both
equitable and legal remedies available.166 The Fair Housing Act
158. Id. § 810(c), 82 Stat. at 86.
159. Id. § 810(a), 82 Stat. at 85.
160. Id. § 810(d), 82 Stat. at 86.
161. Private civil actions are authorized by id. § 812, 82 Stat. 73, 88.
162. Id. § 810(d), 82 Stat. at 86.
163. Courts are authorized to issue permanent or temporary injunctions,
temporary restraining orders, and other orders, but can also award actual
damages and punitive damages up to $1,000. Id. § 812(c), 82 Stat. at 88.
164. See id. §§ 808809, 82 Stat. at 84–85 (laying out the Secretary’s
responsibilities).
165. Title IX of the Act prohibits intimidation in fair housing, id. § 901, 82
Stat. at 89–90, supplementing the Attorney General’s right, granted in
Section 813, 82 Stat. at 88, to enforce the Act.
166. The Act was substantially amended in 1988 with a specific focus on
improving the remedial process by providing for an administrative
enforcement system before administrative law judges, private civil actions in
courts, and the “pattern or practice” cases brought by the Justice Department.
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 814, 102 Stat.
1619, 1634. The 1988 amendments replaced Sections 810–813 with new
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shows the rapid evolution of civil rights enforcement thinking
from the contested, hedged, and primarily equitable structure of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In part, this reflects the legal rights
approach that was developing in the courts throughout the
decade.
2.

Emergence of a Parallel “Rights” Regime

Throughout the 1960s, the private-right-of-action strain of
rights enforcement would gain momentum. As the Court upheld
the constitutionality of and clarified the availability of
individual causes of action to enforce rights under the three
seminal civil rights statutes, it identified additional causes of
action against racial discrimination under remains of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statues. In Jones v. Alfred
Mayer,167 the Court recognized a cause of action to enforce a
prohibition on discrimination in housing under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982.168 It later upheld a cause of action to enforce a
prohibition on racial discrimination in contracts under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.169 Notwithstanding the focus on equitable remedies in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
and the complex structure of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
actions at law for damages became available in housing and
employment discrimination cases. Implied rights of action had
been recognized to challenge discrimination in federally-funded
programs and voting rights,170 providing damages as a remedy
in the former.171 This background of private rights of action
informed Congress’s subsequent legislation prohibiting
language. Id. The new enforcement structure preserves the remedial blend of
damages, equitable relief, and attorney’s fees. Id. § 813(c), 102 Stat. at 1633.
167. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
168. See id. at 413.
169. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976) (“It is now well
established that . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibits racial discrimination in the
making and enforcement of private contracts.”); Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (“[Section] 1981 affords a federal
remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.”).
170. See, e.g., Tokaji, supra note 153, at 126–33 (summarizing the rise and
fall of implied rights of action).
171. See id. at 126 (“[W]here [violation of a federal statute] results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover damages from the party in default is implied.” (quoting
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916))).
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discrimination on the basis of sex among recipients of federal
educational funds (Title IX)172 and discrimination on the basis
of age in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of
1975.173 And though Title IX was silent on a private right of
action and the ADEA relied on a complex Fair Labor Standards
Act administrative structure, the private right of action was
widely assumed to exist and to provide access to legal
remedies—that is, money damages.174
This enforceable-legal-rights strain of civil rights
jurisprudence emerged in 1961 with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Monroe v. Pape.175 Monroe facilitated suits in law or
equity under § 1983 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act by reading
“under color of state law” to include behavior that was not
specifically authorized by the state but undertaken by a person
clothed in state authority.176 In doing so, Monroe gave practical
meaning to the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.177 But
the true effect was the creation of an avenue for enforcement of
constitutional rights through actions for damages—actions at
law.178
The promise that Monroe would make civil rights into
property-like entitlements enforceable on par with private
rights was not to be realized. Beginning in the 1970s, the Court
aggressively limited suits for recovery of money damages,179

172. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686.
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
174. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (holding
that an implied private right of action exists under Title IX); Franklin v.
Gwinnett Cnty Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (holding that a “damages
remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX”).
175. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
176. Id. at 184.
177. See id. at 171.
178. See id. at 172.
179. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding
that a private right of action under Title VI does not permit disparate impact
proof); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)
(stating that the Supremacy Clause does not create a cause of action to seek
injunctive relief against the enforcement or implementation of state
legislation).
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even as it created hurdles to and limits on equitable relief.180
However much the Court’s efforts were aimed at limiting the
kinds of rights suits that could be litigated, its efforts have not
led to a repudiation of those rights.181 Rather, this Article’s core
argument is that the Court has recast these enforceable legal
claims in the shape of equity to cabin their effect while
preserving their application in certain cases. Efforts to reduce
the role of equitable remedies in the complex social-change cases
that Abram Chayes famously called “structural reform”182 led
courts to similarly limit damages actions.183
Monroe’s damages-based approach departed from the
“eradicating Jim Crow” approach of Brown and presaged the
post-structural reform, legal remedies-focused character of civil
rights actions to come.184 With a parallel system of rights
operating to compliment the Brown-based approach, damages
and equitable actions would ebb and flow as primary means of
enforcing rights.185 Even as damages actions gained acceptance
and were incorporated into civil rights statutes like the Fair

180. See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding
Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1235 (2005) (“Over
the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has limited the scope and reach
of these injunctions . . . based on federalism, comity, and separation of powers
principles.”).
181. See id. at 1235–41 (describing the adverse impact on civil rights
injunctions during the second half of the 20th century as “substantial, but not
fatal”).
182. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976).
183. See id. at 1292 (“It is perhaps too soon to reverse the traditional
maxim to read that money damages will be awarded only when no suitable
form of specific relief can be devised. But surely, the old sense of equitable
remedies as ‘extraordinary’ has faded.”).
184. Compare Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170–75 (focusing on Congress’s
intention to give “to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights,
privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages
against the wrongdoer”), with Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 487–93 (1954) (focusing
on the “circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment” and “the effect of segregation itself on public education”).
185. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 947–48 (explaining how the Court’s
equitable remedy in Brown created a preference of providing equitable, instead
of monetary damages, in civil rights cases); John M. Greabe, Constitutional
Remedies and Public Interest Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857,
872– 73 (2013) (discussing the prevalence of injunctions to remedy civil rights
issues in the decades after Brown).
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Housing Act of 1968 or allowed as judicially recognized means
of enforcing aspects of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting
Rights Act, the emerging structural injunction—which arguably
became synonymous with civil rights for a time—was the main
mechanism for confronting Jim Crow.186
The choice of a primarily equitable approach to the Court’s
initial confrontation with Jim Crow in Brown set the terms for
civil rights equity. Civil rights during this period was
predominantly equitable. But perhaps more significantly, civil
rights came to echo the role and shape of traditional equity—it
was an exceptional tool for an extraordinary problem, wielded
in the pursuit of justice for innocent children. The dramatic
social consequences of the Brown decision and the momentous
legislative victories that the 1960s Civil Rights Acts represented
may have obscured that the choice of equity was a compromise
and relatively conservative.187 When the Court’s focus shifted
away from confrontation with Jim Crow, these choices would
continue to frame civil rights suits as exceptional interventions,
for extraordinary situations, and for deserving complainants.
II.

CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY: STRUCTURING RIGHTS LITIGATION
IN THE POST-CIVIL-RIGHTS ERA

Civil rights are equity because it came to operate under
limitations on litigation drawn directly and indirectly from
traditional equity restraints.188 The effect of these limitations is
the creation of a hierarchy of rights that both defines civil rights
equity and is defined by the assumptions of what cases are
appropriate according to traditional equity restraints.189 Civil
rights remains a quest for justice undertaken by judges sitting
in equity and exercising broad discretion in the review of
claimants’ lawsuits.190 However, the 1970s saw a shift in
perspective from eradicating Jim Crow to addressing
discrimination and similar, discrete, individual-focused
186. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 936.
187. See GRAHAM, supra note 58, at 371 (arguing that Brown II was a
conservative decision because it only required a “prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance,” at a “deliberate speed”).
188. See Rudovsky, supra note 180, at 1235.
189. See id. at 1212.
190. See id. at 1235–38.
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claims.191 Without the goal of eradicating Jim Crow root and
branch, broad remedies like the structural injunction
increasingly appeared unjustified, even unjust, as third-party
interests and other externalities were recognized as being
implicated by judicial intervention.192 But individual suits for
damages raised other concerns.193 This shift in perspective
inaugurated a retrenchment period during which concerns
about judicial activism extended beyond equity powers to courts’
role in individual damages actions.194 Civil rights equity results
from distinguishing between good and bad cases during this
period, a distinction informed by traditional equity restraints
applied to law and equity alike.
A.

From Retrenchment to Civil Rights Equity: A Definition of
Civil Rights Equity

Civil rights law has been retreating for over forty years, the
target of multiple forces combining to restrict the substantive,
procedural, and remedial scope of civil rights actions.195
[T]he Supreme Court (and in recent years, the Congress) has
restricted civil rights remedies though a series of complex
and controversial measures, including expanded immunities
from suit, narrower standards for standing and for private
enforcement of civil rights legislation, exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, limitations on remedies in criminal cases
and federal habeas corpus, and direct federal court
door-closing legislation.196

As one commentator put it, “[A]s opponents of the rights
revolution mobilized, they . . . focused their attention on these
very same institutional components” that had driven the rights
revolution, “a vastly broadened and empowered institutional

191. Phillip Bobbit sees this shift as fundamental to the “Age of Consent”
he identifies. Phillip Bobbit, The Age of Consent, in 2 GRANT GILMORE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 100, 125–26 (2014).
192. See Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV.
981, 993 (1993).
193. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 15 (1983).
194. See Rudovsky, supra note 180.
195. See id. at 1210–11.
196. Id. at 1200.
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judiciary.”197 Retrenchment was rooted in an attack on “judicial
activism” and broader efforts to turn the judiciary in a
conservative direction.198 Substantively, this retreat is rooted in
a cycle of revival and limitation on approaches to civil rights
statutes and constitutional provisions.199 More broadly,
retrenchment has been associated with concerns about judicial
activism disrupting the federal balance, concerns about a “flood”
of litigation burdening courts, and hostility to both civil rights
plaintiffs and litigants more generally as benefiting from a
litigation system that is viewed as unjust.200 Retrenchment is a
process rooted in objections to Brown and its progeny, that
gained strength in the 1970s, and that has arguably become a
defining feature of the federal judiciary’s approach to civil rights
law since at least 2000. Civil rights equity is what courts’
approach to civil rights looks like in the aftermath of a wide
range of restrictions on civil rights actions imposed in the last
forty years.201 Civil rights equity describes the nature of civil
rights litigation as a consequence of this retrenchment period.
Civil rights equity is a narrow, goal-focused jurisprudence
projecting the aims of equity as justice but limited by a revival
of traditional equity-based restrictions in the form of
constitutional doctrine, procedural prerequisites, and
substantive proof requirements. The ability of traditional equity
to do justice—to override the complex, detailed, and universal
elements of law—was a tremendous power that was limited to
those circumstances where law was deemed inadequate. Equity
buttressed law and underscored its legitimacy, even as equity

197. SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 5–6 (2015).
198. See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE OF CONTROL OF THE LAW 56–57, 88–89 (2008).
199. See John Valery White, Vindicating Rights in a Federal System:
Rediscovering 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)’s Equality Right, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 145,
148– 51 (1996) (characterizing the jurisprudence of Reconstruction Era
legislation as competing between a “revival” and a “limiting period”).
200. See Lynda G. Dodd, Introduction to THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
REVISITED: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 1821 (Lynda Dodd ed., 2018).
201. Civil rights equity reflects an additional irony in that it is arguably
the equitable character of the FRCP that both facilitated the civil rights legal
revolution while also underlying the criticisms of federal litigation as too
proliferate. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 986–87.
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overruled law in the exception. Imitating traditional equity, civil
rights equity reinforces the constitutional structure that civil
rights threatened to upend and formalizes the primacy of
private (state) law that federal civil rights threatened to broadly
override. Between civil rights as a living, expansive legal
jurisprudence and civil rights as a basis for exceptional
intervention in the interest of justice, civil rights equity imposes
the latter. Like traditional equity, civil rights equity is dynamic
and ever evolving but ultimately narrow, as it limits civil rights
to extraordinary circumstances.202
Civil rights equity originates in resurgent understandings
of the appropriate use of equity jurisprudence in civil rights
cases. Accordingly, judicial intervention ought to be limited to
circumstances in which the “law” is inadequate, on behalf of
individuals who are harmed, and in the interest of justice
understood from the community’s perspective. Though one
might object to the lack of individual focus in the Court’s
intervention in Brown and post-Brown school desegregation
cases,203 it is easy to see that the then-evolving idea that
segregation was unjust demanded extraordinary intervention
because of the complete lack of effective legal remedies.204 As the
Brown moment was lost, the sense that equitable intervention
was necessary or appropriate was undermined. In the absence
of de jure segregation, the “inadequacy of the law” assumption
encouraging broad judicial intervention was weakened.
Extraordinary intervention seemed less compelling, as did the
assumption that such interventions were doing justice,
particularly in complex multidimensional cases affecting
third-party non-litigants.205
Traditional equity bequeaths to civil rights jurisprudence a
legacy of tools aimed at limiting access to the tremendous power
of equity. Those tools, mimicked in constitutional doctrine, in
procedural decisions, or used as federal common law, treat civil
202. See White, supra note 199, at 151 (“This period of upheaval in
American law has produced a civil rights jurisprudence characterized by broad
but significantly limited rights of action.”).
203. This is the objection of Gary McDowell, though one might suggest that
McDowell also diminishes the harm of Jim Crow and the challenge for courts
forced to confront it. See MCDOWELL, supra note 58, at 97.
204. See FISS, supra note 32, at 8.
205. See Chayes, supra note 182, at 1284.
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rights cases like traditional equity while facilitating application
of those limitations by demanding that cases be narrow,
episodic, and individually focused.206 Roughly, this is the
construction of civil rights, which retrenchment courts
substituted for the mission of eradicating Jim Crow.
Civil rights equity is a product of the shift from efforts to
excise Jim Crow from American life and economy to the pursuit
of justice in individual civil rights cases, resulting in a
deemphasis on structural change (integration) and repudiation
of broad policy solutions (busing, affirmative action). But by
focusing on individual claims, courts risked being drawn into
ruling on the details of day-to-day operations of institutions,
being dragged into relatively small disputes, and being
compelled to review the adequacy of processes and procedures,
often governing small stakes controversies. Civil rights equity
reflects solutions to these problems that echo restraints on
traditional equity jurisdiction. For example, Paul v. Davis207
locates some disputes as state law disputes;208 the reasonable
officer standard in qualified immunity cases makes intervention
turn on significant departures from expected behavior;209 and
courts’ reluctance to pursue the implications of their procedural
and substantive due process jurisprudence insulates the
judiciary from second guessing on-the-ground judgment calls by
the state and its officers.210 “Justice” has a particular shape in
these cases, requiring substantial departures from widely
accepted practice—outrages—to support judicial intervention.
Underlying it all is a fundamentally fact-intensive focus that
empowers jurists to weigh the justice of a case in a relatively
206. See Rudovsky, supra note 180, at 1235–36 (“[W]hile the Court has not
heeded calls to eliminate the structural injunction, it has imposed procedural
hurdles that substantially erode the availability of the equitable remedy.”).
207. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
208. See id. at 711 (holding that “the interest of reputation asserted in this
case is neither ‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation
without due process of law”).
209. See, e.g., Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730, 746 (2002).
210. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (applying “the
Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a
substantive due process standard” to a use of force case); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) (stating that a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim for deprivation of life required a
showing of deliberate or reckless indifference).
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unbounded way. Projecting these developments forward would
produce civil rights equity.
B.

Restricting Structural Injunctions with Equity

The revolutionary character of the Civil Rights Movement
and the consequent enthusiastic talk about rights obscured the
fact that civil rights were ambiguously defined.211 This provided
broad power to courts to do equity but offered little in the way
of articulating the character of the rights to be protected, much
less how an individual might claim a protected right as a
personal entitlement.212 This was doubtlessly intentional,
permitting flexibility to address the challenge of dismantling
Jim Crow while ensuring that courts could, per Brown II,
balance the many interests implicated. When courts’ broad
equitable powers were restricted, however, the lack of precise
definitions meant that courts continued to have tremendous
power to judge which cases demanded judicial intervention
without much direction or restraint. Civil rights equity emerged
from efforts to restrain this broad judicial power first in equity
then in damages cases.
One might maintain that the civil right movement’s legal
legacy was as much the creative use of equity as it was the
development of substantive rights. The rights of the period were
largely defined during the Reconstruction Era,213 only to be
rendered impotent though narrow interpretation.214 The
invocation of equity powers in Brown II and the subsequent use
of injunctions became characteristic of the judicial and
congressional response to the Civil Rights Movement before and

211. See, e.g., Henson, supra note 137, at 84–87 (arguing that
“discriminate” in Title VII is not well defined).
212. See MCDOWELL, supra note 58, at 97–99 (arguing that Brown
“broadened [the] concept of equity . . . [as a] major source of an assumed
judicial power to formulate—rather than merely negate—public policies,”
without giving clear guidance on what rights should be granted equitable
relief).
213. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (holding
that discriminatory application of a neutral law, a law that is “fair on its face,”
violates the Constitution).
214. See Gressman, supra note 98, at 1338–43.
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after the passage of the key civil rights acts of the 1960s.215
Writing in 1978, Professor Owen Fiss noted:
Brown gave the injunction a special prominence. School
desegregation became one of the prime litigative chores of
the courts in the period 1954–74, and in these cases the
typical remedy was the injunction. . . .
The impact of Brown on our remedial jurisprudence . . . was
not confined to school desegregation. It also extended to civil
rights cases in general, and beyond civil rights to litigation
involving electoral reapportionment, mental hospitals,
prisons, trade practices and the environment.216

Use of the injunction expanded throughout the Civil Rights
Movement.217 In addition to being a key tool for dismantling Jim
Crow in public schooling, enforcing those decrees saw the use of
anti-obstruction injunctions, initially against governors leading
“massive resistance” to desegregation, then eventually directed
against the faceless mob though ex parte orders effective against
all with notice of the order.218 As noted above, civil rights
statutes emphasized equitable remedies by creating or
heightening the Attorney General’s power to enjoin
discriminatory activity and by creating individual suits that
permitted equitable remedies (or in some cases permitted only
equitable remedies, such as in Title VII).219 In 1966, the new
215. See FISS, supra note 32, at 4.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 21–23.
218. See id. at 16–17.
219. Fiss argues that “[t]he injunction became the primary remedy in civil
rights litigation for a very special set of reasons.” Id. at 86. Those reasons were
“technocratic—civil rights litigation presented the courts with technical tasks
that could not be performed by remedies other than the injunction, or that
could not be performed as well.” Id. at 87. They included the fact that the
injunction was “well suited for the preventive needs of civil rights litigation”
as it was aimed largely at government officials who might not have been “as
sensitive to the prospect of damage judgments.” Id. But he also notes that the
superiority of the injunction related to the peculiar nature of the systematic
oppression of Black Americans:
[W]hen the demand was to compensate for the systematic and
thorough wrongs of slavery, the Jim Crow era, or the more subtle,
and recent, forms of discrimination, cash payments seemed
peculiarly inadequate. The inadequacy stemmed from
considerations
much
deeper
than
difficulties
of
measurement . . . [but instead] from the group nature of the
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Rule 23(b)(2) was added to the FRCP to permit class actions for
similarly situated plaintiffs,220 allowing anti-discrimination
litigants to proceed as a class if characteristically equitable
remedies were sought.221
The judiciary’s aggressive use of equitable powers was
linked to the unique difficulties of dismantling Jim Crow—a
system of official and unofficial racial subordination (or better
yet, white supremacy) that operated throughout the country,
though concentrated and most extreme in the South.222 The
grinding oppression and racial terror in the South triggered two
great migrations of Black Americans out of the South.223
Between 1915 and 1970 “some six million black southerners left
the land of their forefathers,” changing the direction of
American and Black history.224 Not only were conditions in the
South oppressive, the segregation there was virtually complete
with few contexts where Black Americans were not completely
excluded from civic life; they were always relegated to a
subordinate position.225
Conditions were definitively better in the rest of the
country, but Black Americans were still excluded from prime
underlying claim and a belief that only in-kind benefits would effect
a change in the status of the group.
Id. at 87. From a normative perspective, Fiss believes the injunction was
superior because it gave agency to individual claimants and the courts. See id.
at 88. In the first decade of the civil rights period the control over initiating
actions and the independence of judges in issuing injunctions was crucial to
the process because the other branches were unlikely to act. See id. at 88–89.
In the second decade it supplemented the power of the Attorney General to
address civil rights issues. Id. at 89.
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
221. See FISS, supra note 32, at 15.
222. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 381–89 (explaining the history of
racial segregation and biases in the United States from 1850–1900); id. at 384
(“White supremacy in the deep South was total.”); id. at 523–37 (summarizing
constitutional rights, civil liberties, and race relations in the twentieth
century); id. at 524 (“In the South, where most African Americans lived, the
early part of the [twentieth] century was the high noon of white supremacy.
Blacks had no political power. They had no vote.”).
223. See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY
OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 9–11 (2010).
224. Id. at 9; see id. at 556.
225. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); LEON
F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW
(1998).
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opportunities everywhere they moved.226 While the second great
migration, which ran from World War II to 1970, took place
during the period of greatest prosperity in American history,
and though Black Americans showed their willingness to move
great distances to take advantage of those opportunities, they
found themselves in California, Michigan, and New York
relegated to secondary status with limited access to the
industrial employment that characterized that period of
American prosperity.227 At the end of the extended post-war
boom, after perhaps a quarter of Black Americans pursued
access to prosperity by moving across the country,228 one-third
of Black Americans lived in poverty (twice the rate of poverty of
the nation as a whole).229 At the root of this disconnect was the
widespread insistence that “good” jobs and homes were not for
Black Americans.230 Redlining and restrictive covenants
226. FREIDMAN, supra note 47, at 529 (“The North had its own brand of
apartheid, more subtle than the southern form, but also quite real.”).
227. See William P. Jones, Building of America: The Making of the Black
Working Class, NATION (Oct. 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/7JHU-CT77
(reviewing JOE WILLIAM TROTTER, JR., WORKERS ON ARRIVAL: BLACK LABOR IN
THE MAKING OF AMERICA (2010)).
228. Wilkerson’s estimate of 6 million great migration migrants
constitutes 26.5 percent of the 22,580,289-Black population in 1970 when the
migration ended. Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics
on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to
1990, for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States tbl. A-1
(U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 76, 2005), https://perma.cc/5CNRUJTM (PDF).
229. COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON LITIGATING FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE 105 (Kevin R. Johnson et al., eds., 2009).
By 1959 when the census employed its current measure of poverty
rates 55.1 percent of black Americans lived in poverty, more than
double the 22.4 percent of the population in general. Black poverty
decreased steadily through the civil rights period, due largely to the
migration of black farmers to cities. . . . Consequently, by 1967 the
rate of poverty for black Americans was 39.7 percent and 33.5
percent in 1970. . . . [M]ajor reductions in black poverty rates
mostly ceased in 1970, with poverty rates for African Americans
holding steady for twenty-five years at about one third of the Black
population.
Id. The overall poverty was 15.1 percent in 1970, half the rate for Black
Americans, a ratio that has been stubbornly consistent. UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: PEOPLE AND FAMILIES
1959-2020 tbl. 3, https://perma.cc/9U2B-AJPL (PDF).
230. See Jones, supra note 227.
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deprived Black residents of access to housing, and thereby
schools, segregating access to social capital outside the South.231
Crowded into ghettos, Black residents in the North, Midwest,
and West became subject to increasingly hostile encounters with
police forces that included few Black officers.232
Though Brown had initially been skeptically received,233 the
decision and the extraordinary judicial powers associated with
it were eventually embraced in recognition that dismantling Jim
Crow was a difficult task.234 Brown transformed into a beacon of
justice.235 But not every aspect of life under Jim Crow was
viewed as entangled with Jim Crow.236 Nor were aspects of life
that could be linked to Jim Crow universally viewed as
problematic. Rapidly, distinctions emerged between official (de
jure) and informal (de facto) segregation, and prohibited and
permissible discrimination.237 Aspects of life (private clubs) were
cordoned off from the remedial effort.238 Importantly, nearly all
231. While dramatic and widespread in the case of Black Americans, the
system of segregation built around Jim Crow extended to other groups as well,
turning on the degree to which they were not accepted as white.
232. See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2069 (2017).
233. See Wechsler, supra note 111, at 3135; Bickel, supra note 111, at
14.
234. See Katie R. Eyer, The New Jim Crow Is the Old Jim Crow, 128 YALE
L. J. 1002, 1033 (2019) (emphasizing that victories in court “chipped away” at
the ability to exclude African Americans, yet true equality was not a reality).
235. See Paul Finkelman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme
Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 978 (2005)
(noting that Brown served as a “moral force” by setting the stage for
dismantling formal racial segregation).
236. This is the power and political importance of William Julius Wilson’s
The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American
Institutions, which argued that a substantial explanation of Black poverty was
the deindustrialization of American cities and a culture of poverty. In
distinguishing Black poverty from segregation, Wilson’s work was invoked to
support reining in extraordinary civil rights remedies and focusing instead on
individual acts of discrimination. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1st ed. 1978).
237. See Ulysses Jacks, De Facto Segregation and Brown—A
Constitutional Duty or Continued Despair?, 15 HOW. L.J. 319, 319 (1969)
(articulating the difference between de facto and de jure segregation).
238. See When Is a Private Club Not a ‘Private Club’?, ACLU PA. (Aug. 21,
2009), https://perma.cc/WSJ4-SDMC (noting that after the Civil Rights Act
was passed, many businesses argued that they were “private clubs” so they
could remain segregated).
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vested rights (employment, segregated housing) and many
existing means of distributing social goods were insulated from
efforts to dismantle Jim Crow.239 These exclusions significantly
circumscribed efforts to address the then-present effects of Jim
Crow and extended those effects into the future.240
Two decades after Brown, civil rights jurisprudence was
characterized by tremendous powers vested in courts to address
Jim Crow but with significant limitations on what those powers
could be deployed to do.241 The exclusion of vested interests
(however linked to Jim Crow) informed views about the nature
of rights by implying that some conditions were not related to
Jim Crow and not rightfully subject to judicial action.242
Beginning early on, many saw inequality as independent of Jim
Crow, inequality existing in the urban North.243 In this
increasingly contested policy space, there was growing
impatience with the seemingly protracted length and broad
extent of the anti-Jim Crow effort, particularly as other issues
captivated the public’s attention and civil rights remedies
affected more people outside the South.244 In the school

239. For a discussion of exclusions from Title VII, see Henson, supra note
137, at 74–77.
240. See Palma Joy Strand, The Invisible Hands of Structural Racism in
Housing: Our Hands, Our Responsibility, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 155, 157
(2019) (explaining that, although discriminatory initiatives such as redlining
have now been illegal for fifty years, the pattern created by redlining is still
strikingly clear).
241. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, African-American Rights After Brown, 24 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 201, 204 (1999) (noting that courts and judicial decisions have
legitimacy and can produce social reform but that political pressure did not
follow until a decade after Brown was decided).
242. See WILSON, supra note 236, at 63 (discussing public office elections,
where the probability of a white constituency electing a Black man was nearly
zero, as an example of such conditions).
243. This is the major import of the Moynihan Report on the Negro Family
along with scholarship explaining urban inequality on conditions and culture
in urban ghettos. See STEPHEN STERNBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM
RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 119 (1995) (citing LEE
RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF
CONTROVERSY (1967)); ADOLPH REED, JR., STIRRINGS IN THE JUG 193 (1999)
(describing recent attempts to sanitize the “nefariously racist and sexist
Moynihan Report” as “truly sinister and pernicious”).
244. See Eyer, supra note 234, at 1018 (discussing the impact
desegregation advocacy had on the North).
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desegregation field,
systematically:

the

Court

narrowed

the

project

By very close margins, the Court ruled that de facto
segregation could not be remedied, that interdistrict
transfers of students were not permissible absent a showing
of past discriminatory practices, that there was no duty for a
state to provide a funding system that would ensure equality
in funding of local education, and that lower courts could not
continue to enforce desegregation programs that were not
believed to be narrowly tailored to meet the original
segregation patterns.245

By 1978 “[t]he momentum [had] been lost,” with the
axiomatic status of Brown being questioned and a focus on
rolling back school desegregation efforts that were widespread
in Congress and the courts.246 However, Professor Fiss’s effort to
reconceptualize the injunction, and in doing so justify
“structural” and “reparative” injunctions247 captured the
dynamic, anti-formalism that still prevailed among jurists on
the bench and in the academy alike. The energy of the civil
rights period may have dissipated by the late 1970s, but the
legacy of equitable remedies persisted.248 Restraining court
power became an increasing focus, tied up with limiting which
aspects of Jim Crow were appropriate subjects for change.249
Many vested rights and practices having been excluded
from being addressed as products of Jim Crow, the focus of
judicial intervention was increasingly pointed at de jure
segregation and intentional discrimination.250 Resistance to
efforts to address ongoing effects of discrimination (e.g., busing)
merged with opposition to policies developed to address those
245. Rudovsky, supra note 180, at 1204–05.
246. FISS, supra note 32, at 5.
247. See id. at 9–10 (defining the two types of “retrospective” injunctions).
248. See George Rutherglen, Private Rights and Private Actions: The
Legacy of Civil Rights in the Enforcement of Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 733, 738
(2015) (noting that Civil Rights advocates took the opportunity to sue for relief
such as equitable remedies in the Title VII context).
249. See John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the Origins
of the Activist Insecurity in Civil Rights Law, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 303, 312
(2002).
250. See Michael L. Wells, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans After
Parents Involved: Bringing State Action Principles to Bear on the De Jure/De
Facto Distinction, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2008).
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effects independently (especially affirmative action in
education, government contracting, and employment).251 Thus,
where courts’ use of equitable powers seemed to point in the
direction of redistributive policies, those policies were
increasingly attacked as illegitimate.252 Importantly, however,
the rollback of civil rights era achievements continued to reflect
an equity-rooted mission of doing justice, albeit redefined. As
courts focused less on Jim Crow and more on individual
claimants, they were pushed increasingly to take the interests
of third parties into account and, as such, courts’ intervention to
dismantle Jim Crow came to seem less unequivocally “just.”
Tellingly, debates focused on “innocent” third parties and unjust
beneficiaries of doctrines that focused more on groups than
individuals.253
Restricting equity powers was the vehicle for this
transformation of civil rights. Fiss emphasizes how relaxing
traditional equity rules that had subordinated injunctions to
other (presumably common law) remedies were crucial to the
success of Brown254 and how the revival of those doctrines has
been key to the rollback of civil rights law, which was beginning
as Fiss was writing.255 In 1974, in O’Shea v. Littleton,256 the
Court seemed “bent on reversing the practice of resorting to the
injunction as a primary remedy and [was] narrowly
circumscribing, if not cutting back on, the injunction even in the
civil rights domain.”257

251. See id. at 1030 (identifying Supreme Court precedent which held that
the scope of a district court’s power is broad when remedying past harms, and
thus this power encompasses race-conscious remedies such as busing
students).
252. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2062, 2104 (2002) (reasoning that redistributive policies were open to
objections because the resources were being taken away from white people and
given to people of color).
253. This debate culminates in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
254. See FISS, supra note 32, at 38–42.
255. See id. at 42–44 (referencing Younger v. Harris and O’Shea v. Littleton
as examples of civil rights cases limited by reinvigorated traditional equitable
rules that subordinate the injunction).
256. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
257. FISS, supra note 32, at 43–44.
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The role of “traditional equity doctrine” in service of
constitutional structure has been critical to this rollback. Fiss
examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette258 for its revival of the irreparable injury rule in
service of protecting what Younger v. Harris259 would later call
“Our Federalism.”260 In addition to viewing this theory of
federalism as “unsound,” Fiss faults “the use of the irreparable
injury doctrine to demarcate the bounds of the state and federal
courts.”261 Equity, or the revival thereof, has been a key
component of the Court’s efforts to cabin civil rights and their
effects on the Constitution:
The Court would have us believe that it is only making a
point about remedies, when it is in fact making a point about
the structure of the federal system . . . . The irreparable
injury formula invokes the traditions of equity, and thereby
enables the Court to forward its view of federalism without
having to justify fully its value preference . . . .262

Fiss emphasized that the irreparable injury rule is not only a
smokescreen, but also too narrow for the Court’s purposes.263 He
suggests that “comity” might be a better framework for
explaining the Court’s concern in Jeannette; however, it is in its
focus on remedies that the Court established the jurisdictional
hierarchy it believes the Constitution requires.264 The
invocation of equity as a tool in the rollback of civil rights not
only turned equity rules into tools for restricting remedies, but
also gave the Court an instrument for interpreting the
Constitution in light of “tradition.” It also gave the Court access
to a system that was especially focused on cabining
extraordinary judicial powers, just when reining in an “activist”
judiciary was becoming a more accepted rallying cry of civil
rights critics.265

258. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
259. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
260. FISS, supra note 32, at 61–68.
261. Id. at 67.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 68.
264. Id.
265. See LINO GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLSA SHARPLY CRITICAL VIEW OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY

1941

As Fiss anticipated, courts would work over the next two
decades to circumscribe use of the structural injunction, with
Congress ultimately prohibiting its use in the context of
prisons.266 The use of broad equitable remedies to effectuate
school desegregation saw a similar fate, beginning the same
year Fiss’s book was published.267 And, as Fiss noted, the Court
had already created substantial limitations on broad equitable
remedies to criminal justice systems said to be
discriminatory.268 The restrictions of Rizzo v. Goode269 and
O’Shea would be solidified in Los Angeles v. Lyons,270 while
attacks on disparities in criminal prosecutions would be
dismissed by the Court in death penalty cases.271 By the
mid-1990s, the civil rights injunction had been mostly
repudiated.272
The rollback of civil rights was not limited to extraordinary
equitable remedies, however. The Court and Congress limited
use of injunctions more generally.273 “Whether imposed by
Congress or by the courts, these restrictions on injunctive relief
broadly reflect common law conceptions about the role of equity.
They depend on background principles about the scope and
effectiveness of alternative remedies and about the kinds of
cases that can properly be brought.”274 By 1978, courts had also
already placed significant limitations on the damages-based
RULINGS THAT LED TO FORCED BUSING 258–59 (1976) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s power to invalidate unconstitutional policies).
266. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2004).
267. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974).
268. See FISS, supra note 32, at 40 (noting that there is a preference for the
criminal remedy and thus the court will not issue an injunction “unless the
plaintiff demonstrates the inadequacy of the criminal remedy”).
269. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
270. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
271. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294 (1987) (arguing that the
petitioner’s data on racial disparities was inadequate and thus there was no
constitutional violation).
272. See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction:
Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 143, 163 (2003) (arguing that
barriers to structural reform are really barriers to liberal structural reform).
273. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform
Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1395–1400 (2007) (explaining how federal
courts could “develop their own conceptions of equity jurisprudence” while
Congress could “enact restrictive statutes” against federal injunctions).
274. Id. at 1398.
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recovery in Section 1983 cases, reading into that statute
immunities for government officers275 and interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment to bar damages recovery from states.276
These limitations would be further developed in the ensuing
decades, significantly circumscribing damages actions under
Section 1983 with the consequence that “money damages are
currently not available for routine constitutional violations.”277
As the civil rights revolution was built on the creative use of
equity remedies, a rollback built around revival of traditional
equity tests and limitations is unsurprising.278 The surprise is
that the Court would give preference to equity over damages
actions when confronted with the damages actions created
under Section 1983 and in parallel to Brown’s injunction-based
regime.279 Civil rights equity explains this preference by
surfacing the Courts’ application of an equity-based approach to
rights claims for equity and damages claims alike.

275. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974) (finding that
qualified immunity extends to officers of the executive branch, with variations
dependent upon the discretion and scope of responsibilities of the office).
276. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)
(concluding that suits seeking remedies against a state for deprivations of civil
liberties are barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless the state waives its
immunity).
277. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 273, at 1403.
278. See id. at 1410.
279. In 1978, Fiss had already recognized the preference of injunctions
over damages actions:
Indeed, in several recent cases, somewhat removed from civil
rights, classically defined in terms of protecting the racial minority,
doctrine has been created that seems to give a primacy to the
injunction. In Pierson v. Ray the court created an immunity for
judicial officers that might be applicable only to damage remedies;
in Edelman v. Jordan involving the invalidity of a state practice
denying welfare payments, the Court case an Eleventh Amendment
immunity around damages actions that is not applicable to
injunctive remedies; and when the court finally—after the long
post-Bell v. Hood interlude—held that constitutional prohibitions
of their own force gave rise to action so for damages if they were
violated, it also imposed on such damage actions restrictions—such
as a good faith defense—not applicable to injunctions.
FISS, supra note 32, at 90; see Reinert, supra note 39, at 93643. Jeffries and
Rutherglen resolve this puzzle by emphasizing the importance of adequate
remedies at law as the basis for injunctions. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra
note 277, at 1399.
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The shift in focus in civil rights cases from eradicating Jim
Crow to responding to individual rights claims changed the
underlying vision of injustice that the courts are deployed to
eradicate without changing the predominantly equitable
framework for thinking about civil rights litigation.280
Individual damages actions perhaps require case-by-case rights
articulation, akin to that of the common law to frame injustice,
as traditional equity does not define injustice.281 As Stephen N.
Subrin has observed,
The defense of equity power in constitutional cases designed
to restructure public institutions tends to undervalue the
problem of how to translate rights . . . into daily realities for
the bulk of citizens. Aspects of common law procedure and
thought, not equity, may be required to help deliver or
vindicate rights, now that equity has opened a new rights
frontier.282

Such an approach demands that courts identify injustice for
individual claimants from the facts of particular disputes which
would form binding precedent in similar cases. That is, with the
effective repudiation of the anti-Jim Crow project, civil rights
become potentially unbounded and in need of precise definitions
of discrimination, abuse of government power, due process, and
similar concepts that had become the core of civil rights
litigation.283 Rather than developing such definitions (and a
common law of civil rights), courts defined justice in civil rights
cases as it was under traditional equity: a fact-intensive
examination in particular cases, accessible only where plaintiffs
overcome a raft of procedural limitations on the court’s ability
to intervene.

280. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 933 (noting that important and
strategic consequences flow from the Supreme Court’s approach to equitable
remedies).
281. See Subrin, supra note 46at 974 (noting that federal legislation
required courts to resolve complex cases).
282. Id. at 913
283. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Treating Blacks as if They Were White:
Problems of Definition and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4
(1975) (explaining how civil rights legislation such as Section 1982 fail to
define precisely the content of the rights protected by it).
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Emergence of Civil Rights Equity

Civil rights equity emerges from judicial resistance to
structural injunctions. That resistance was characterized by the
revitalization of limits on equitable remedies in civil rights
cases. However, the imposition of equitable constraints would
not be limited to cases utilizing broad equitable remedies.
Courts limited causes of action for damages in civil rights cases
through use of traditional immunities and increasingly strict
proof requirements. On their face, the limits in these “law” cases
bear scant resemblance to equitable restrictions A closer look
reveals that the structure of equitable limitations, designed to
check the awesome powers of courts sitting in equity, frame and
inspire courts’ retrenchment efforts more generally, providing
substance to an otherwise generalized and vague notion of
judicial restraint.
Equitable power is awesome. Even as only a supplement to
law, unrestrained equity would be daunting. Samuel Bray offers
a compelling anatomy of how these tremendous powers made
equity courts vulnerable and how restraints on equity power
emerged.284 Bray contends that equitable remedies survived the
merger of law and equity because courts require a way to compel
action or inaction.285 The challenge of ensuring compliance with
equitable orders286 necessitates powerful tools like contempt287
wielded solely by the judge,288 which Bray calls “equitable
management devices.”289 Given the tremendous authority these
remedies and equitable management devices vest in courts,290
“equitable constraints” exist to limit courts’ power, mitigate the
possibility of abuse by parties, and determine plaintiffs’
reasonable expectations.291 The equitable constraints Bray
describes include those commonly associated with equity, like

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 582.
Id. at 553.
See id. at 563–64.
See id. at 564–68.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 563–72.
See id. at 572.
Id.
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the requirement that there be no adequate remedy at law,292 or
equitable defenses, like laches and clean hands.293 Others, like
the requirement of equitable ripeness, resemble similar
constitutional doctrines.294 The focus of equitable defenses, like
the other restraints, is “equity’s refusal to allow the power of
these remedies to be used on behalf of a plaintiff who acts
unjustly.”295
Equitable constraints have a direct role in civil rights cases
as those cases often seek equitable remedies, sometimes along
with damages.296 Equitable constraints, like equitable standing,
are recast as constitutional doctrine, with the effect that courts
must ask if the plaintiff’s case is an appropriate one as a matter
of subject matter jurisdiction.297 But in damages actions, these
equitable constraints exert an influence beyond their direct
application because civil rights damages actions, like equity
actions, vest broad powers in the judge. The fact-intensive
nature of most civil rights cases gives potentially expansive
scope to rights claims that judges feel they need to constrain.
Diverse civil rights claims are fact intensive: discrimination
cases are framed around intentional use of a protected category
to cause an adverse result;298 due process cases ask whether the
plaintiff received the process due;299 and excessive force cases
292. Id. at 580–81. No adequate remedy at law is a constraint, but one that
Bray notes is not difficult to meet in that there are no definitive rules
governing this finding. Its importance lies in the determination that the
remedy is equitable, that it maintains the “‘conceptual exceptionalism’ of
equitable remedies.” Id.; see DOUG LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 22 (1991) (finding that a remedy is adequate only when it is as
complete, practical, and efficient as the equitable remedy—the legal remedy
almost never meets this standard).
293. See Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 581–82.
294. Id. at 578–79. Equitable ripeness demands significant factual
development in support of equitable remedies overlapping with “constitutional
doctrines of ripeness and standing, as well as abstention doctrines.” Id.
295. Id. at 581.
296. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98 (1983).
297. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 943 (emphasizing that there are
barriers to obtaining injunctive relief, with the standing doctrine being the
most prominent).
298. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(maintaining that discrimination in Title VII claims is a question of fact).
299. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 53643 (1981) (comparing
the facts of that case to the facts of prior precedents).
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ask, for both qualified immunity and the constitutional right,
whether the officer exercised reasonable force under the
circumstances.300 These are “how high is high” questions,
turning on assessment of the facts under the circumstances by
the fact finder.
This open-ended, fact-intensive approach promises judicial
openness to a broad range of cases, but procedural, structural,
and proof limitations in civil rights damages suits mean that
“[m]oney damages are most likely to prove effective against
extreme or egregious constitutional violations and least likely to
work well against borderline misconduct that might reasonably
have been committed in good faith.”301 And where explanations
of behavior, like discrimination, are skeptically received, civil
rights litigation proves ineffective.302 Bray’s observations about
equity constraints apply to damages actions. They are
constrained in an effort to “guide the responsible exercise of
judicial power . . . by focusing a judge’s attention on certain
situations where equitable remedies and enforcement
mechanisms are most likely to be misused.”303
The emergence of equity constraint-like limits is perhaps
obscured by the recognition and expansion of damages actions
from Monroe through the Court’s rejection of the structural
injunction.304 The shift to individual suits for damages implied
a move from equity’s pursuit of justice in unusual situations to
law’s vindication of individual rights in everyday
circumstances.305 From the start the Court’s damages
jurisprudence emphasized process and procedure, while
300. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendes, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546
(2017) (stating that the reasonableness analysis carefully considers the facts
and circumstances of each case).
301. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 273, at 1405.
302. See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and
the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1300 (2012)
(finding that people are reluctant to make findings of discrimination in cases
such as disparate treatment in the employment context).
303. Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 584.
304. See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 273, at 1401 (noting that money
damages played a small role in vindicating constitutional rights prior to
Monroe).
305. See id. at 1392 (arguing that until the staple of modern civil rights
litigationindividual
rights
protected
by
the
Fourteenth
Amendment— assertions of constitutional rights were obscure).
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eschewing the development of substantive elements for rights
claims. Even as courts recognized rightsrights to be free from
discrimination and excessive force, and rights to due process of
lawplaintiffs were tasked with proving the ultimate fact of
those rights violations without much guidance from substantive
precedent.306
It is now apparent that rights actions for damages,
characterized by this fact intensiveness and increasingly
predominant procedural nature of the litigation, extended the
fundamental shape of the Court’s prior equity approach to its
damages jurisprudence.307 Fact intensiveness duplicated the
unbounded structure of equity and gave courts broad authority
to provide (now damages) remedies. A case like McDonnell
Douglas,308 which structured Title VII’s nominally equitable
employment discrimination litigation but left the question of
discrimination unanswered, might have seemed to advance the
promise of rigorous rights enforcement. But what it did was
extend the possibility of continuing the Court’s relatively
unbounded power as the burden shifting of McDonnell Douglas
was read to be only a burden of production which fell away when
met, leaving plaintiffs to prove “discrimination vel non.”309 The
ultimate focus on discrimination vel non310 vests courts with the
task of determining what constitutes discrimination and
introduces the related prospect of litigants abusing the power of
the courts (through invasive discovery or abusive litigation). It
left open the need for equitable restraint even as the focus on
discrimination vel non was extended to discrimination suits for
damages under Sections 1981 and 1983.311
306. See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive
Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (2016) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
curtailment of the right against excessive force, which has made it difficult for
victims to overcome defendants’ motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment).
307. See Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, supra note 31, at
1003 (stating that before the new equity cases, the Supreme Court was unsure
of the amount of weight to give to historical distinctions between legal and
equitable remedies).
308. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
309. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–10 (1993).
310. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
311. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr.-Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct.
1009, 1019 (2020).
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An equity “style” is also projected by the characteristic
balancing of interests this fact intensiveness facilitates. “The
modern Supreme Court frequently requires the withholding of
substitutionary constitutional relief [including damages] under
doctrines . . . developed to protect the perceived public
interest.”312 Though one would be surprised to see a court
routinely apply equitable defenses like laches or unclean hands
in a civil rights damages case, civil rights doctrine is broadly
characterized by its balancing approach that sub silentio
imports the undue hardship defense into the dispute. And the
fact-intensive nature of most civil rights doctrines permits
courts (and then juries) to diminish assertions of rights
violations by those with unclean hands, even if that doctrine is
nowhere cited and the question is a “legal” one. Moreover, what
Abram Chayes said of juries—“one of the virtues of the jury was
thought to be its exercise of a roughhewn equity, deviating from
the dictates of law where justice or changing community mores
required”313—applies to judge and jury in the system of civil
rights that leaves so much to a fact-based judgment.
Courts
facing
difficult
disputes
have
perhaps
unsurprisingly found refuge in the structure and tools of
equitable constraints. If courts are generally suspicious of civil
rights claims, if they simply worry that the cases might push the
court into conflict with other branches, or if courts just wish to
limit access to the judiciary, it should not be surprising that
these legacy tools for limiting judicial power, albeit in equity,
influence efforts to limit the courts’ power.314 Chayes said in
1976:
[T]he Burger Court may be seen to be embarked on some
such program for the restitution of the traditional forms of
adjudication. Its decision on standing, class actions, and
public interest attorney’s fees, among others, achieves a
certain coherence in this light . . . . One suspects that at
bottom its procedural stance betokens a lack of sympathy

312. Greabe, supra note 185, at 858; see id. at 881–96 (noting that the
Supreme Court has deemed itself to be free to advance the perceived public
interest).
313. Chayes, supra note 182, at 1287.
314. See Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 534.
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with substantive rights and with the idea of District Courts
as a vehicle of social and economic reform.315

Equitable remedies (injunction, subrogation, etc.) are powerful
tools that put courts in direct conflict with defendants and
prompt potential noncompliance with judicial orders.
Simultaneously, civil rights cases involving contested
rights, like antidiscrimination, privacy, and freedom from
excessive force, put courts at odds with defendants who have
incentives to resist the court’s judgment. This is because the
accusation suggests moral reprehensibility in discrimination
cases, abuse of power in privacy cases, or a lack of
professionalism (with horrendous consequences) in police abuse
cases. A loss in such cases also deprives the defendant of full
authority over property or control over policymaking. Courts
may be able to force payment of damages, but their ability to
generate compliance with the underlying values is compromised
where defendants: deeply disagree with the values (e.g.,
antidiscrimination on the basis of sexual identity); object that
they were in violation of the values (whether an employment
decision was “based” on the protected category in discrimination
cases); believe these values conflict with moral or political
beliefs (anti-abortion legislation); or maintain that actions
underlying the cases were necessitated by the circumstances
(police abuse cases), putting the court’s legitimacy in question.
Cities might be “accountable” to Ben Crump’s clients by paying
a settlement while never confronting the values underlying the
civil rights litigation the settlement resolves.316
If the difficulty of ensuring compliance defines equitable
remedies,317 the difficulty of inducing compliance with
constitutional and statutory values defines civil rights cases for
damages, particularly when the underlying value questions
implicate the interests of networks of parties and nonparties in
315. Chayes, supra note 182, at 1304–05.
316. See Treisman, supra note 5 (explaining that although civil
settlements can compensate victims in police violence proceedings, they have
not been shown to make a positive change in the belief systems of police officers
and other city government officials).
317. See Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 563–64
(detailing that, although legal remedies rarely show any issues with
compliance, there is a higher degree of difficulty in forcing compliance with
equitable remedies).
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multidimensional ways akin to structural injunction cases. In
such contexts, courts struggle to be on the “right” side of civil
rights disputes. This complexity is often cast as the case being
“political,” and it is suggested that courts should avoid political
cases.318 But every case has political implications, so the charge
is too broad, and “political” is too narrow a characterization for
what defines these cases. Rather, it is their multidimensionality
that makes them complex and difficult.319 And just avoiding
them gives preference to the status quo ante, legitimizing the
actions of the defendant potentially at the cost of constitutional
values. Equitable constraints limit access to equitable
remedies320 and structural injunctions321 in multidimensional
cases. Civil rights equity emerged as a way of ameliorating the
problems presented by such cases, whatever the remedy
raised.322 By constructing a predominately procedural
jurisprudence with generally defined rights, civil rights
damages actions mirror traditional equity, with a broad focus on
justice by balancing interests, access to which is limited by the
procedural stricture of equity constraints.
In recent years courts have demanded that cases be more
conventionally
and
narrowly
structured
through
a
characteristic focus on process and procedure in federal

318. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1224–26 (1978)
(examining the relationship between constitutional norms and the political
question doctrine).
319. See Chayes, supra note 182, at 1284 (examining the shift in federal
litigation from disputes between private parties pertaining to “private rights”
to disputes of constitutional and statutory policies).
320. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57
(2010) (outlining a four-factor test where a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunctive relief must show that, among other factors, remedies available at
law are inadequate to compensate for an injury); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006) (enforcing the Court’s decision rejecting
the replacement of traditional equitable considerations with a rule that
injunctions might automatically follow an injury).
321. Chayes describes six ways in which “the judiciary may have some
important institutional advantages for [managing structural reform
litigation].” Chayes, supra note 182, at 1307–09.
322. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 913 (explaining that using historic
equity powers has allowed judges to “breathe life into sacred constitutional
rights and to permit such rights to evolve and expand as society attempts to
become more humane”).
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litigation generally and civil rights litigation in particular.323
The trend revives efforts to restrict the “equity” aspects of the
FRCP. These restrictions were rejected during the drafting of
the rules and are aimed at constraining litigation.324 The
rejected push to require pleadings to be more specific325 is reborn
in the Iqbal326/Twombly327 requirements.328 Rejected efforts to
limit discovery329 are accomplished through Iqbal/Twombly and
through the court’s emphasis on dismissing suits at the earliest
possible moment in qualified immunity civil rights suits against
officers.330 The rejected proposal to permit judges to issue an
“order formulating issues to be tried”331 has been accomplished
through aggressive use of summary judgment.332 Though civil
rights jurisprudence severely limits equitable claims while
simultaneously pointing litigants to equitable relief over
damages,333 the jurisprudence in damages actions grants judges
powerful tools to restrict access to the courts and narrow claims
while resisting defining substantive rights.
Perhaps ironically, these efforts to restrict the equity
aspects of the FRCP place judges in the position of equity judges,
magnifying their power to restrict judicial access in complex
cases. While the rejection of notice pleading in Iqbal/Twombly
and the operation of qualified immunity frees public employee
defendants from the inconvenience of litigation, the doctrines
also reflect the belief that public employees ought to be freed of
323. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569–70 (2007)
(discussing the pleading standards for claims in federal courts).
324. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 985–86.
325. See id. at 977–79 (discussing a proposal for “lawyer verification”).
326. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
327. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
328. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (establishing that a complaint must contain
sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face to survive
a motion to dismiss); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547 (requiring a lower standard of
specificity for which a pleading only needs to have enough facts to state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face).
329. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 977–78 (providing examples of efforts to
limit discovery that courts rejected).
330. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982).
331. Subrin, supra note 46, at 978.
332. See id. at 982.
333. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 936–43 (discussing the doctrinal and
rhetorical preference of injunctions over damages in civil rights litigation).
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the tremendous oversight power of the courts absent a specific,
clear case of wrongdoing.334 These doctrines permit courts to
determine more easily whether they are facing a complex,
multidimensional civil rights dispute implicating multiple
interests, and therefore requiring the judge to limit access to a
substantive application of the characteristically fact intensive
rights, which would be applied through equity-like balancing in
any event.335 Instructively, Iqbal involved national security
policy where, behind the simple structure of claimant versus
government, there lay the interests of the untold masses
presumably protected though national security.336
The demand for specificity is an outgrowth of the fact
intensiveness of civil rights claims, which gives judges a central
role in managing civil rights disputes not unlike the role that
judges occupy in structural injunction cases.337 Just as the party
and issue complexity magnify the judge’s role in structural
reform cases, fact intensiveness in damages cases demands
judicial management to restrict potentially broad rights.338 As
in equitable suits, judges are the principle figures in civil rights
damages cases, weighing the public interests while deciding
numerous procedural questions focused on whether a claim is
appropriate for judicial resolution.339 Throughout, balancing
typifies the contemporary approach to damages actions,340
334. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading—Why Now?, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2010) (exploring issues that might arise if
plaintiffs are given great latitude in pursuing investigations of wrongdoing by
defendants, like high costs of litigation and the presence of nuisance suits).
335. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (discussing the Court’s ability to insist
on specificity in pleadings before permitting an enlarged factual controversy
to ensue).
336. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009) (discussing the
implications of subjecting high-ranked government officials to the “burdens of
discovery” based on a complaint that is nonspecific in its nature).
337. See Greabe, supra note 185, at 882 (explaining that the Supreme
Court has insisted that courts “define rights at a very high level of specificity”
when determining whether those rights are “clearly established”).
338. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (establishing
that a right must be clearly established so that a reasonable person can
understand the “contours” of the right).
339. See Greabe, supra note 185, at 889 (detailing the various federalism
doctrines that Court has developed that can “deflect from federal court
jurisdiction justiciable claims for specific relief” for constitutional wrongs).
340. See id. at 881–88.
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whether through individual immunity in suits against
individual officers341 or the emphasis on the plaintiff’s burdens
of poof in employment discrimination cases.342 Surviving the
gauntlet of procedural hurdles, plaintiffs must establish a
quantum of outrage sufficient to convince the judge (then the
factfinder) that justice demands judicial intervention, however
loosely the parameters of justice under the right concerned are
defined.
A damages jurisprudence with unbounded, fact-intensive
rights vests great power in courts to enforce civil rights but
duplicates many problems of equity jurisprudence and thus begs
for limits on invocation of judicial power. The high barriers that
developed to limit access to the courts—from Iqbal/Twombly’s
specificity requirements, to summary judgment practice, to
immunities—empower judges to manage disputes.343 This
equity-like
structure
is
particularly
valuable
in
multidimensional cases where many interests are implicated
and where the legitimacy risks of judicial intervention are
greatest. Surviving the procedural gauntlet of judicial
management and constraint, plaintiffs’ rights are further
subject to the balancing of interests and de facto deservedness
judgment by fact finders loosely bound by fact intensive rights.
This is civil rights equity.
D.

The Structure of Justice: Civil Rights Equity and a
Hierarchy of Rights

Civil rights equity generates different approaches to
different kinds of rights claims. Just as the requirements of
equity traditionally created a hierarchy of remedies with legal
remedies superior to equitable ones, civil rights equity defines a
hierarchy with some claims superior to others. This hierarchy
also delimits the cases to which civil rights equity’s
management and constraints are applied. At the top of this
hierarchy are cases involving the recognition of rights and
identities, followed by “civil liberties” claims—cases of
government abuse of an individual that are simple in structure
341. See id. at 881–84.
342. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993).
343. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 360–61 (2010).
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and effect—then “civil rights” claims. Positive rights, which are
generally not recognized and are unprotected, are at the bottom
of this hierarchy.344
Courts can decide recognition and civil liberties claims
without resorting to civil rights equity techniques. Civil rights
cases, defined as complex, multidimensional rights cases
implicating multiple interests, are subject to civil rights equity
management and constraints. The line between civil liberties
and civil rights cases is fluid, turning on the perceived
complexity of the dispute. Similarly, recognition cases typically
emerge from efforts to enforce civil rights.345 Consequently, the
distinctions between the types of claims in the hierarchy usually
emerge during litigation, diminishing the value of the hierarchy
for describing cases before they are litigated. But the categories
matter in terms of how courts are likely to approach cases.
Categorization is ad hoc and controlled by the judge.346 The
typically fact-intensive inquiries in rights cases not only put the
judge at the center of the litigation, but they also grant the judge
a perspective to determine whether the dispute is a
multidimensional one in need of management or a simple one
with a straight-forward question. Simpler cases, with a simple
party structure that reflects the parties truly in interest, and
with adverse positions, have a reduced need for the
management devices and constraints of civil rights equity. Such
cases can be resolved on narrow questions reminiscent of
common law claims: Is the plaintiff’s claim recognized by law?
Has the plaintiff’s right been violated by the defendant? Can the
plaintiff be made whole without implicating third parties? Thus,
courts can resolve recognition and civil liberties cases by
determining if the plaintiff has a protected right that has been
violated. As cases become more multidimensional, implicating
additional interests or where remedies would do so, the

344. Positive rights such as the right to health care are typically beyond
the scope of rights enforcement, though a court could recognize such a right in
the federal or a state constitution or legislation, transforming it into a civil
rights recognition case.
345. See generally Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (enforcing the right to
equal protection of the law).
346. See Spencer, supra note 343, at 360–66 (detailing the judges’ power
to manage litigation).
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management devices and constraints of equity become vital.347
Civil rights equity allows judges in complex, multidimensional
cases to manage the interests involved and, importantly, restrict
the courts’ intervention to social outrages.348
The different approaches to relatively simple versus
complex and multidimensional cases are exemplified by courts’
approach to “new property.”349 Even as courts were expanding
the Brown-based injunction—determining how to enforce the
rights created by civil rights statutes, and providing damages
actions for constitutional violations—courts started to contend
with the right-privilege distinction that had informed judicial
approaches to the distribution of government largess.350 Courts
were informed by Charles Reich’s influential The New Property,
which documented the scope and significance of governmental
largess as well as the consequences of treating a variety of
government gratuities as “privileges” to which individual
recipients had no enforceable claim.351 Reich defined his goal at
one point as explaining “the weakening of civil liberties in the
public interest state.”352 Among his many examples are cases
where the government denied or withdrew funding, contracts,
or licenses because of recipients’ political affiliation, speech, or
refusal to reveal past political associations.353 Reich diagnosed
the problem as “the public interest” being utilized to undercut
individual claims to government largess.354 This was possible
because public interest had been read too singularly,355

347. See Chayes, supra note 182, at 1297–98 (exploring changes to
litigation processes by courts resulting from extending impacts of judicial
decisions).
348. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 343, at 369–70 (offering a theory known
as “ordered dominance” in which restrictive doctrines, like heightened
pleading, can be utilized by courts to restrict cases).
349. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
350. See id. at 740 (explaining that early legal protection of rights was
greater than protection of privileges, where a privilege had the potential of
being revoked by a judiciary without notice or hearing).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 774.
353. Id. at 762–69.
354. Id. at 774–77.
355. Id. at 774–75.
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one-sidedly,356 or trivially and vindictively,357 and in all cases
the effect of public interest denials on parties similarly situated
to the claimant were ignored.358 This parade of horribles fueled
development of constitutional law around speech and
association rights, as well as due process protections that
treated government largess as entitlements that recipients
could defend in court under certain circumstances.359
Constitutional law since 1964 has been mostly responsive
to the horribles underlying Reich’s case for new property. One
might call this the civil liberties revolution because the property
interests his article highlighted were most often compromised
through retaliation against free speech or association.360 The
success in this area has not been complete, however. The glaring
exception is welfare entitlements: courts’ early protection of
such rights through procedural due process was quickly
undercut.361 With similar results, courts have been deferential
to state supreme courts’ authority in administering admissions
to the Bar362 and have increasingly treated national security as
a basis for only limited restraints on discretion in the
government’s response to national security threats since 9/11.363
The influence of public interest on civil liberties continues,
with the degree to which courts recognize public interest behind
government decisions diminishing their willingness to see civil
liberties at stake. With the individual pitted against the state,
courts have been amenable to tough review of government
restrictions on liberty. However, the current Court has been
356. Id. at 775.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 776–77.
359. Id. at 774–83.
360. Id. at 763–64.
361. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1975) (limiting Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
362. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 581–82 (1984) (holding that
admission is an act of the judiciary not subject to anti-trust action); Law Sch.
C.R. Rsch. Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 155 (1971) (establishing
that a belief in the form of government and loyalty to the United States are
permissible requirements for admission to the New York Bar).
363. See Madeleine Carlisle, How 9/11 Radically Expanded the Power of
the U.S. Government, TIME (Sept. 11, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/M6FNEYVZ (examining the effects of 9/11 on the U.S. government regarding
national security).
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particularly protective of speech as liberty and suspicious of
even well-reasoned restrictions on speech.364 While courts have
continued to defer to the Bar on admissions, they have brushed
aside the Bar’s worries about lawyer advertising.365 Where
government actions more readily reflect the collective interests
of the citizenry (national security, traditional consumer
protection underlying restrictions on admission to the Bar), the
court has given the government more leeway.366 This distinction
between structurally simple and complex cases define the
difference between civil liberties and civil rights cases, with the
former avoiding civil rights equity’s equity-like approach.
Of course, to assert rights against the government or
anyone else, the right must be recognized, and the identity
because of which the right is denied must be recognized by the
courts as a prohibited basis for denying rights.367 Recognition
cases are generally simple plaintiff-versus-defendant disputes,
even if recognition of some rights or identities implicates
complex interests for future application of those rights or
protection of those identitiescomplex interests that are
apparent when the recognition question arises.368 But
recognition disputes rarely appear fully formed. They generally
arise from assertions of rights in ordinary civil liberties or civil
rights disputes.369 Ultimately, the resolution of recognition cases
turns on the narrow question of whether the Constitution, a
364. See John Roberts and Free Speech: A Report on the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment Jurisprudence, CATO INSTITUTE (2020) [hereinafter Roberts
Court], https://perma.cc/R8KN-H5EW (discussing how Chief Justice Roberts
emphasizes protection of free speech).
365. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977)
(enforcing that the State Bar acts as an agent of a court); cf. Sup. Ct. of N.H.
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (striking down the residency requirement to
sit for the bar).
366. For welfare this is perhaps the defining feature, leading to a
permissive regime because the fiscal interests of taxpayers are ascribed to the
government and balanced against the individual’s interests in process.
367. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015) (“The dynamic of
our constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action
before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation’s courts are open to injured
individuals who come to . . . vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our
basic charter.”).
368. Think Brown I, Roe, and Obergefell as straightforward but weighty.
369. See, e.g., Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 651–81 (examining a claim for a legal
right for same-sex marriage).

1958

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1889 (2022)

statute, or another instrument recognizes the right or identity.
Recognition is thus simple and antecedent to either civil
liberties or civil rights claims.
In contrast to the new property disputes and recognition
cases, civil rights disputes are defined by structural complexity.
In such cases, individuals are cast less against the government
as against one another. In employment discrimination disputes,
for example, the courts are asked to intervene on one or
another’s behalf where the government is not necessarily
present. Or, in structural injunction cases, courts are asked to
intervene to manage the reform of bureaucratic institutions that
themselves manage complex webs of individual interests.370 An
equity-like approach is viewed as more appropriate for
addressing such a dispute, whether the relief prayed for is
equitable or legal. Potentially sprawling private discrimination
cases like Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes371 are the prototype
here, with the court asked to referee a private dispute governed
by public law.372
Public agency discrimination demonstrates how a case can
float between the two characterizations. Such a dispute is like a
new property case (with individual property deprived by the
government on an impermissible basis). Yet the narrowly
conceived dispute can transform in instances where the court
perceives the interests of private citizens behind the
governmental action, prompting the court to resort to
equity-like language of balancing, particularly, but not
exclusively, where the relief requested is equitable. Thus, where
remedies for the aggrieved parties would affect the rights of
incumbents to jobs in public discrimination cases, the court
invokes equitable management devices and equitable
constraints to address the dispute. This is Martin v. Wilkes.373
But even where damages are the requested remedy, courts will
sometimes invoke those equitable doctrines to limit their role as

370. See Gilles, supra note 272, at 144 (“And for a time, the structural
reform injunction loomed large as a powerful tool for the transformation of
social institutions.”).
371. 564 U.S. 338 (2001).
372. See id. at 342 (analyzing the plaintiff’s claim for violation of a public
law against a private party rather than the government).
373. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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“between” the interests of private parties (some of whose
interests are bound to those of the government).374
Police abuse cases lie at the intersection of civil liberties and
civil rights and highlight that party structure is not controlling
in courts’ characterization or treatment. Courts can, and in
police cases do, locate the public interest behind the government
or state actor’s behavior.375 From Monroe through to Board of
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown,376 the Court has
weighed the effects of § 1983 recovery on the public’s interest in
policing. Qualified immunity jurisprudence does so expressly.377
So conceived, the dispute is complex and triggers courts’
reluctance to intervene. Because they see the interests of the
citizenry behind the government’s action, creating a clash
between individuals more so than a conflict between individual
and state, courts recognize a need for the more equity-based
approach of civil rights equity. Invariably, in cases short of
egregious treatment by the government, the balancing of civil
rights equity is tilted in favor of the government acting in the
interests of the public over those of a victim or group that is often
perceived as undeserving (without clean hands).
Assessments of when civil rights equity tools ought to be
applied to rights claims create this hierarchy. Disputes over
recognition are structurally simple and avoid civil rights equity
management, even if recognition of an identity might trigger
complex civil rights claims down the line. Recognizing a person’s
ability to assert rights claims on the basis of their identity or
recognizing a person’s ability to claim a particular right is a
straightforward, if critical, question. For LGBTQ persons to
claim protection from discrimination because of their identity is
vital where seeking protection from discrimination on the basis
of their sex means a defendant’s admission of sexual orientation
374. See Diego M. Papayannis, Independence, Impartiality and Neutrality
in Legal Adjudication, 28 REVUS 33, 37 (2016) (explaining that, if the courts
were to think with a non-neutral mindset when it pertains to the parties, the
function of the law would be defeated).
375. See Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts as Guardians of the Public
Interest, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 148, 149 (1977) (detailing that in modern society
courts play a more established role in protecting the public interest).
376. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
377. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 45, 50 (2018) (examining how qualified immunity operates as a defense
for § 1983 claims).
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discrimination operates as a complete defense.378 Recognition is
essential, though not necessarily sufficient, to success in a rights
regime.
Civil liberties suits arising from government interference
with recognized interests on impermissible bases also avoid civil
rights equity management. But the category is unstable, with
disputes seemingly included in it always subject to
transformation into civil rights cases through the recognition of
interests in the background that render the case more complex
(and thus subject to civil rights equity). Prominent in the civil
liberties category is the Court’s aggressive protection of free
speech, association, and religious rights from interference by
government officers.379 Perhaps surprisingly, the right to be free
from government discrimination lies here, explaining the
Court’s aggressive response to narrowly defined de jure or overt
discriminatory practices380 and its related suspicion of
affirmative action policies.381 In contrast lies the Court’s
strikingly more passive “civil rights” approach to private
discrimination or in providing broad, forward looking
anti-discrimination remedies, both of which create a
multidimensional dispute structure by implicating the interests
of nonlitigants.382
Courts treat most rights cases as civil rights cases, utilizing
civil rights equity management in response to the complex
interests in play. Though civil rights are recognized as valuable
to individuals and particular identities are recognized as
protected from discrimination on the basis of protected

378. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737–54 (2020).
379. See Roberts Court, supra note 364 (explaining that the Court has
taken a firm stance in protecting First Amendment rights).
380. See Theresa M. Beiner, Shift Happens: The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Shifting Antidiscrimination Rhetoric, 42 U. TOL. L. REV 37, 38 (2010)
(discussing the Court subjecting congressional acts that have discriminatory
effects to “strict fact-finding rules” for justification).
381. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (stating, in response to the defendant’s assertion that the
affirmative action policy was necessary to prevent discrimination, that “[t]he
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race”).
382. See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2001)
(examining class certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a
private sex discrimination suit).
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categories, civil rights equity diminishes the practical import of
such recognition. Though rights are defined in property-like
language, implying protection on the same basis as property (or
new property), the perceived, often implicit, multidimensional
structure leads courts to approach these cases as though they
were sitting in equity.383 Whoever the defendant and whatever
the remedy, such suits are subject to doctrines rooted in
equitable management devices and equitable constraints that
characterize civil rights equity.
The structuring of civil rights disputes is evident in the
Supreme Court’s recent treatment of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act where, though acknowledging the existence of a right
to vote in the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act
and recognizing the Act’s prohibition on intentional denial of a
right to vote,384 the Court constructed the statute to grant courts
the ability to judge voting restrictions for the degree to which
they are unreasonable.385
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,386 the
Supreme Court imposed a reading on Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act that limited the ability of plaintiffs to challenge
voting restrictions that had a disparate impact on voting, even
though the Act had been amended in 1982 specifically to reject
the Court’s limitation of Section 2 to cases of intentional
discrimination.387 The Court achieved the result in Brnovich by
reading the 1982 language in the Act to require a “totality of the
circumstances” analysis.388 Using that analysis the Court
weighed the “size of the burden imposed,” the degree to which
the voting rule or regulation at issue departs from standard
383. See Subrin, supra note 46, at 920–21 (outlining the historical basis for
equity jurisdiction).
384. See Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2350 (2021)
(holding that Arizona’s House Bill and out-of-precinct policy did not violate § 2
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). Gorsuch and Thomas, concurring, would read
the Voting Rights Act not to permit a private right of action. See id. at 2350
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
385. See id. at 2346 (majority opinion) (upholding the voting regulation
“[i]n light of the modest burdens allegedly imposed, . . . the small size of its
disparate impact, and the State’s justifications”).
386. 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
387. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), legislative abrogation
acknowledged in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
388. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338.
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practice, and the size of the resulting disparate impact against
opportunities in the whole system to mitigate the impact, and
balanced them against the State’s interest in the voter
restrictions.389
Though the Court ostensibly assessed the disparate impact
of the voting rules, it rejected the prevailing disparate impact
analysis that surely motivated Congress when it amended the
Voting Rights Act to overturn City of Mobile v. Bolden390 and to
ensure that disparate impact was a means to prove a Section 2
violation.391 The Court’s characterization of the case as one of
first impression (analyzing facially neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions on voting)392 foreshadows its insistence that
the plain language of the statute requires the
totality-of-the-circumstances assessment,393 and thus permits
the Court to read the Act as requiring the kind of search for
outrages that characterizes civil rights equity. In contrast, the
dissent would have required the analysis to focus on the
disparate impact test that Congress insisted on reinserting into
Voting Rights Act litigation in the 1982 statutory
amendment.394
In creating the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the
Court read the statute to permit itself (and subsequent lower
courts) to engage in a generally unbounded assessment of how
problematic (how outrageous) the State’s voting restrictions
are.395 It says of burdens imposed on voters by the two
restrictions in question: “these tasks are quintessential
examples of the usual burdens of voting. . . . Not only are these
unremarkable burdens, but the District Court’s uncontested
findings show that the State made extensive efforts to reduce
their impact on the number of valid votes ultimately cast.”396
389. Id. at 2338–40.
390. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
391. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2332.
392. See id. at 2325.
393. Id. at 2338.
394. See id. at 2362 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The language in Section 2 is
as broad as can be. It applies to any policy that ‘results in’ disparate voting
opportunities for minority citizens.”).
395. See id. (stating that the Court is enabling itself to make any
limitations to the Act that it would like).
396. Id. at 2344 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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That is, there is no outrage here because the restrictions are
ordinary in the Court’s mind. The State’s efforts to reduce the
effects of the voting requirements on the overall population
render irrelevant the disparate impact the voting requirements
might impose on the minority populations the Act was enacted
to protect, and makes it immaterial that voting requirements
were passed either because of those effects or in spite of them.397
Importantly, the Court implied that there could be voting
restrictions that violate the Act; however, it is fair and likely
better to read the opinion as completely undermining the Act,398
at least, as the dissent argues, to the extent that “Section 2 was
meant to disrupt the status quo, not to preserve it—to eradicate
then-current discriminatory practices, not to set them in
amber.”399
Whether these arguments represent a convincing reading
of the Act and its legislative intent, the point is that the Court
has constructed a means of analyzing Voting Rights Act
challenges that vests broad discretion in courts to act, but only
where the State’s limitations on voting are extreme and
outrageous in the eyes of jurists. In exercising an equity-like
approach through the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,
courts are charged with balancing the interests involved to
determine whether an injustice is occurring, subject of course to
the review of higher courts and their assessment of the equities
of the case.
The “rights” in the statute may be protected in cases where
discriminatory intent is shown (a civil liberties approach) or
through the more conditioned approach of civil rights equity.
Having reversed an intent finding in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,400 the Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances assessment

397. See id. at 2341 (concluding that the disparate impact model was not
useful on these facts).
398. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Court’s
Voting-Rights Decision Was Worse than People Think, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2021),
https://perma.cc/G7XG-DV7J (suggesting that the Court’s decision “is a
repudiation of the Act’s core aims”).
399. Brnovich v. Dem. Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2121, 2363–64 (2021)
(Kagan, J., dissenting); see Linda Greenhouse, On Voting Rights, Justice Alito
Is Stuck in the 1980’s, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2021, at A17 (arguing that the
Court’s opinion undermined the purpose of the Act).
400. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2348–50.
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becomes the only basis for recovery.401 Of course, had intent
been proven, the State would have lost.402 Similarly, had a state
officer blocked an individual or racial group from voting, the
Court might have viewed the State as violating the Constitution
or statute, though this would have already been prohibited by
Mobile.403 Treating the dispute as a “civil rights” controversy,
the Court analyzed the erstwhile neutral application of the
Arizona statute on the abilities of racial, ethnic, and language
groups to vote, not by assessing those effects directly, but by
judging the broad equities implicated by the case, thus making
room for the state interest to be balanced against the effects of
the voting restrictions.404 Last, the right to vote is constructed
so that it is not the positive right it appears to be in the statute.
States need not take any affirmative steps to ensure their
citizens can vote.405 Rather, states only need to refrain from
interfering with the vote for illegitimate reasons.
III. CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY AS A POPULAR EQUITY
Civil rights are equity because, in the contemporary legal
system, it fulfills the role traditional equity occupied in the
past.406 It does so by operating in ways similar to equity. That
is, it draws on popular equity to define an appropriate role for
civil rights jurisprudence. Civil rights equity is a juridical style
applied to cases that threaten to upset the status quo both in
society and among judicial traditions. Rather than a reversion
to the “received tradition” that Chayes contrasted with the
structural injunction—with its emphasis on judges as neutrals
resolving disputes between individuals asserting common law
rights407—civil rights equity reveals courts mimicking the style
401. Id. at 2332.
402. See id. at 2325 (highlighting that discriminatory intent is a violation
of the Act but that Congress amended the Act to reach further).
403. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 (1980) (suggesting that
this would have been permissible because it was not motivated by a
discriminatory purpose).
404. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2330.
405. See id. at 2338.
406. In this way civil rights equity parallels ADR, one of the systems
nurtured, in part, to cabin its reach. See Main, New Equity, supra note 20, at
344–45.
407. Chayes, supra note 182, at 1285–88.
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of equity. The substance of that style is the supplementary,
subordinate, and instrumental character of equity transposed
onto civil rights jurisprudence through substantive, procedural,
and structural rules.408 In civil rights equity the judge is no
umpire; she is central to a characteristically conservative
jurisprudence.
Civil rights equity is a popular version of equity, less a
comprehensive jurisprudence than a framework for managing
complex rights disputes. It reflects use of the assumptions and
style of equity to manage civil rights disputes without
necessarily breaching the law-equity distinction by explicitly
applying equity rules to damages claims. Civil rights equity is
thus neither an application of traditional equity, nor an
unbounded, ends-driven imposition of justice on disputes.
Instead, it lies between—drawing on widely known, generalized
aspects of equity and applying them in the interest of justice.409
As a popular equity, the terms and requirements of equity are
invoked (directly or tacitly) to cabin courts’ use of power.
The nature of popular equity and how generalized notions
of equity are invoked in contemporary jurisprudence is apparent
in the Supreme Court’s “revival” of equity requirements for
injunctions in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.410 There “the
Court sought to determine the remedies ‘typically available in
equity’ in the days of ‘the divided bench,’ before law and equity
merged” and structure equitable relief around past practice.411
Samuel Bray observed that the Court sought to identify
traditional standards though a quasi-historical inquiry, focusing
on
contemporary
and
nineteenth-century
treatises,
restatements (necessarily from recent years), and law review
articles from the 1970s.412 He sees the Court cobbling together a
408. See Howard L. Oleck, Historical Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (1951).
409. See Alexandru Florin Magureanu, Equity, Justice and Law, 3 J.L. &
ADMIN. SCI. 223, 223 (2015) (discussing the cohesion of equity and justice into
a general principle of equity and justice).
410. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
411. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, supra note 31, at 1015
(quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 94 (2013); Cigna Corp.
v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 438 (2011); Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547
U.S. 356 (2006); Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204,
211 (2002)).
412. Id.
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vison of equity “from when those rules were most systematically
expounded”413 while “sometimes work[ing] into its artificial
history more recent cases and scholarship”414 to create an
approach with a “measure of stability and the capacity for
change that are characteristic of a tradition.”415 Whatever its
value as history, the Court’s conclusions commanded support
from a variety of Justices, culminating in two unanimous
opinions in the line of jurisprudence following eBay.416 Its
approach works as jurisprudence.417
The Court’s artificial history is utilized in eBay to articulate
a “traditional” four part test for permanent injunctions on the
basis of “well established principles of equity” despite the
absence of such a test before.418 Key to the Court’s test is the
“entrenchment of doctrinal formulations that distinguish legal
and equitable remedies: the irreparable injury rule and the ‘no
adequate remedy at law’ requirement”419 that most scholars
thought had been superseded by the merger and by general
practice.420 eBay transforms a popular equity-based artificial
history into hard doctrine, requiring a moving party seeking a
permanent injunction to show
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that

413. Id. at 1022.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1023.
416. See id. at 1015–16 (“[T]he opinions for the Court have been written
by four different Justices. One was by Justice Scalia, for a narrow majority;
another was by Chief Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court; the third was by
Justice Breyer for a large majority; and the most recent was by Justice
Kagan.”).
417. See id. at 1020–23.
418. Id. at 1023–30.
419. Id. at 1029.
420. See id. at 1006 (stating that most remedies scholars concur that the
adequacy requirement is outdated and has no effect on judicial
decision-making).
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the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.421

This formulation bore some relationship to approaches in some
states but was in fact new.422 Though each part of the test has
roots in traditional equity, scholars had presumed the first two
to be one—and one that was largely dead.423 In any case, the test
has proved popular in lower courts and was made central to the
exercise of equitable powers as it was extended to apply
notwithstanding the statutory basis of the suit424 and was
extended to preliminary injunctions425 and to stays.426
In other words, the Court engaged in a popular equity
analysis to revive rules of equity that, while generally
referenced by courts, had been thought to have lost any
decisional authority. As Bray notes, those rules emphasize
aspects popularly associated with equity by jurists:
The Court’s repeated inquiries into the scope and content of
“equitable relief,” and its turn to an idealized history and
tradition as the authoritative source for those inquires,
represent an unexpected and striking revival of equity. It
was unexpected, given decades of scholarship skeptical of

421. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
422. Bray notes that Kansas’s and Tennessee’s state supreme courts
utilized similar formulas but that, “as Douglas Laycock put it, ‘There was no
such test before, but there is now.’” Bray, The Supreme Court and the New
Equity, supra note 31, at 1025 (quoting DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 427 (4th ed. 2010)).
423. See LAYCOCK, supra note 292, at 37 (“Injury is irreparable if plaintiff
cannot use damages to replace the specific thing he has lost.”).
424. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155–58
(2010) (suit under National Environmental Policy Act). Bray summarizes:
“[T]he formulation of the injunction standard in eBay has had extensive reach.
As is common with decisions in remedies and procedure, it has transcended
the substantive context in which it arose. It has become the leading federal
authority on the requirement for a permanent injunction.” Bray, The Supreme
Court and the New Equity, supra note 31, at 1024 (citations omitted).
425. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–91 (2008). The Court has
emphasized that the requirements are not permissive and plaintiffs must
prove that irreparable injury is likely. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires
plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is
likely in the absence of an injunction.”).
426. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428–32 (2009) (applying a similar
approach to that applied in Winter to stays).

1968

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1889 (2022)

equity’s past. More importantly, these cases are striking
because of the doctrines they reinforce. The Court has
emphasized that equitable remedies are never given as of
right, may only be given when there is a showing of
irreparable injury, are exceptional, and are marked by
discretion—a discretion that is guided by traditional tests
but exercised case by case.427

This foray into popular equity by the Court makes sense because
it concerns equitable remedies. However, general notions of
equity are part of our juridical DNA. A parallel system to the
common law—adopted into most states’ legal regimes wholly
from the law of England like the common law—equity is an echo
resonating throughout American jurisprudence.428 General
notions of equity constitute a part of the background
understanding of “law” for American lawyers that, particularly
after the merger, is not limited to equity jurisprudence.429 This
is especially the case with federal rights that invoke the courts’
equitable remedial powers but are not so limited.430
The popular equity analysis that gives meaning to eBay’s
equity rules reflects the use of traditional equity as a
generalized source of rules of decision, a judicial style even.
Popular equity permits courts to invoke historical notions of
equity to declare how aspects of American jurisprudence ought
to operate, particularly, but not exclusively, when equitable
remedies are implicated. Equity has well-known characteristics
that structure its use. It is permissive, supplemental,
exceptional, and discretionary. Thus, invocations of popular
equity are not unbounded and drawing on it means drawing on
a particular and conservative structure.
Civil rights equity is the use of popular equity to mold and
structure courts’ approach to civil rights cases. In contrast to
427. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, supra note 31, at 1044.
428. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217,
230–32 (2018) (outlining the history, importance, and variety of equity in
American legal jurisdictions).
429. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONT. PROBS.
53, 53 (1993) [hereinafter Laycock, The Triumph of Equity] (“The distinctive
traits of equity now pervade the legal system. The war between law and equity
is over. Equity won.”).
430. See Morley, supra note 428, at 238 (“Uniform, federally established
equitable standards governed all aspects of injunctive relief in both federal
question and diversity cases.”).
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eBay, its use is not limited to equitable remedies nor is it limited
by the revival of historically rooted rules to limit structural
injunctions. Civil rights equity restricts the courts’ powers in
particular cases—civil rights claims implicating multiple
interests. Courts manage such cases and delink right from
remedy by mimicking equitable constraints. Like equity cases,
civil rights cases are “managed,” with plaintiffs asked to
overcome a number of tests questioning whether they are
deserving of a remedy, beginning with justiciability, but
including special and demanding pleading rules, and subjecting
their demand to the weighing of their interests against the
interests of the defendant to determine deservedness in a
characteristically fact-intensive litigation. The result of this
approach is a civil rights regime that treats cases less as claims
of right than as requests for succor in extraordinary
circumstances. Well-worn notions of equity as intervening to
resolve an injustice where there is no adequate remedy at law
and for claimants with clean hands are represented in a civil
rights landscape where plaintiffs’ claims are subordinated to
private rights implicated by their claim, made fact-specific, and
where courts are given to intervention only where cases present
“outrages” to commonly held notions of justice. Civil rights
recovery becomes permissive, supplemental to the private law,
exceptional, and largely discretionary.
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS AS CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY
What appears to be a complex, detailed legal regime giving
meaning to rights recognized under the Constitution or in
statutes has become a juridical backstop, focused on addressing
injustices and with relatively little day-to-day value to citizens
in courts.431 Civil rights jurisprudence is simultaneously
complex and vague; it is characteristically procedural and
fact-intensive. This nature situates judges to sit as in equity,
limit civil rights to extraordinary circumstances, and
subordinate civil rights to private law.

431. See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY ET AL., RIGHTS ON TRIAL: HOW WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 5 (2017) (describing the
complexity of the legal framework and the challenges faced by plaintiffs in
discrimination law).
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The procedural and the fact-intensive nature of civil rights
actions make civil rights like traditional equity. Civil rights
litigation is characteristically procedural.432 Plaintiffs face
stringent
justiciability
heavy
pleading
burdens,433
requirements434 that are applied independently to each remedy
sought,435 and limits on access to equitable remedies derived
from traditional equity.436 The generally open-ended
substantive causes of action mean many of these procedural
hurdles reemerge as the facts of a case are developed and proof
structures foreclose any shifting of burdens of proof to the
defendant.437 These procedural hurdles make civil rights claims
difficult to pursue and win.438
432. Suits in federal courts are subject to procedural hurdles due to federal
courts’ limited jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
433. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Though the Court rejected heightened pleading in
§ 1983 cases, see Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), the Twombly and
Iqbal pleading requirements might amount to much the same. See, e.g., Wood
v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 75961 (2014) (holding that allegations of First
Amendment viewpoint discrimination did not meet the pleading standard).
434. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984) (“[F]ederal courts
may exercise power only in the last resort and as a necessity, and only when
adjudication is consistent with a system of separated powers and the dispute
is one traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process.”).
435. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)
(differentiating between the availability of damages and an injunction); see
also HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND
PRACTICE 473 (2d ed. 2004)
Lyons, then, makes it virtually impossible for the victim of police
abuse to secure injunctive relief against a local government entity
for practices of its police or sheriff’s department. Evidently the
Court places considerable faith in civil damage actions and, in
criminal cases, the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct.
This faith, if not completely ill founded, is at least exaggerated.
436. See Bray, Systems of Equitable Remedies, supra note 90, at 545.
437. “Much of the development of federal employment discrimination law
in the courts and many of the Supreme Court’s employment discrimination
opinions have focused on the proof structures used to analyze individual
disparate treatment claims.” William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.: McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1683, 1687
(2015).
438. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts:
Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Willkie v. Robbins, 2006 CATO
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Civil rights cases are also characteristically fact
intensive.439 Discrimination,440 due process,441 illegal seizure,442
SUP. CT. REV. 23 (2007) (discussing limitations to Bivens actions); Theodore
Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDS. 4, 57 (2015).
439. Consider the requirements in Title VII employment discrimination
cases. The Supreme Court’s key precedents in employment discrimination
cases consistently avoid defining discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green sought to structure the proof of discrimination from limited facts that
showed the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job. See 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973). That limited-facts approach is now abandoned. See St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 51011 (1993) (plaintiff’s burden to prove
discrimination persists even when pretext is shown); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (emphasizing that the plaintiff must
show discrimination); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313
(1977) (statistics can be used to prove discrimination); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affs.
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981) (presumptions go away when met);
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (discrimination is
a question of fact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1993)
(mixed illegal and legal motives might support discrimination); McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995) (after-acquired evidence
that would support dismissal does not bar a plaintiff’s suit); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 136 (2000) (proof of pretext
could support a finding of discrimination); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539
U.S. 90, 95 (2003) (circumstantial evidence alone can support a “motivating
factor” instruction to the jury in a mixed motives case); Ash v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 458 (2006) (stating that pretext might be shown by evidence
of superior qualifications and refusing to define standard for pretext claims
based on superior qualifications). In none of these decisions does the Court
seek to describe what discrimination is, much less structure the plaintiff’s
proof around such a substantive definition. Instead, the Court has tinkered
with structures for proof and asked what to make of different kinds of evidence
proffered by the defendant, leaving the question of discrimination open-ended
and unchanged from its articulation in Teamsters. See 431 U.S. at 357–58.
440. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 (1993) (stating
that presumptions in employment discrimination cases go away and plaintiff
must prove discrimination).
441. Procedural due process guarantees the process due under the
circumstances. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing
the factors that guarantee procedural due process). Substantive due process
prohibits arbitrary government behavior of an extreme kind that is
context-specific. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)
(“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the
constitutional sense’ . . . .” (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 129 (1992))).
442. Unreasonable use of force is judged by considering objective
reasonableness, a test that is fact specific, incapable of precise definition, and
viewed from the officer’s perspective. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396–97 (1989). The “objective reasonableness” that governs use of force cases
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and others are broadly and vaguely defined rights, with proof of
claims turning heavily on negligence-like notions of
reasonableness443 and cause.444 In suits against government
officers, the qualified immunity defense imports another layer
of fact intensive inquiry focused on the officer’s perception of
reasonableness under the circumstances.445 “The effect is to
resembles and duplicates qualified immunity analysis. See Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 196 (2004); County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct.
1539, 1546 (2017) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” in favor of
an objective reasonableness test); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397
(2015) (clarifying that the objective reasonableness test is the only test in
qualified immunity cases).
443. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–84 (2007) (reexamining
the record to determine the objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions).
444. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403 (1997) (reciting the Courts’ decisions on municipal liability and the
requirement of showing causation between the single decision of the policy
maker and the injury causing employee’s action).
445. The Court first read qualified immunity as an included part of Section
1983 in Scheuer v. Rhodes. 416 U.S. 232 (1970). Scheuer’s focus on subjective
intent was jettisoned in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), which
emphasized the objective reasonableness requirement in the interest of
defendants avoiding meddlesome suits that might make officers hesitant to do
their jobs and expressed concern that subjective intent did not permit suits to
be dismissed without trial and may have necessitated intrusive discovery. See
id. at 816–18. In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011), the Court modified
the objective component of the test, emphasizing that the right alleged to be
violated must be “sufficiently clear that every ‘reasonable official would have
understood that what he was doing violates that right.’” Id. at 741. Though the
Court did not require a case on point, it said that “existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.
In cases involving police use of force, the application of these rules has
been increasingly deferential to officer decisions. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987), the Supreme Court reversed denial of immunity, emphasizing
that immunity would attach if “a reasonable officer could have believed that
the search” was constitutional. Id. at 668 n.23. Similarly, in Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004), the Court found that qualified immunity was
available for an officer who shot a fleeing suspect that he had been chasing on
foot when the suspect got in a car and started to back out despite being ordered
to stop. Id. at 201. Brosseau’s per curiam opinion pointed to the dearth of cases
involving “whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through
vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that
flight.” Id. at 200. The Court has emphasized that a case on point was not
required to support clearly established law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
744–45 (2002). However, the Court focused on the absence of a case on point
in Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199; Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 245 (2014);
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768 (2014); and Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S.
744, 759 (2014). In Plumhoff v. Rickard, a unanimous Court emphasized the
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establish a liability rule of negligence with respect to
illegality . . . [shielding] a vast range of garden-variety
unconstitutionality
from
vindication
though
money
damages.”446 Yet, the requirement that the plaintiff bear the
ultimate burden of proving discrimination or illegal use of force
is said to be justified by the fact that constitutional and
statutory rights cases require proof of intentional rights
violations.447 The effect is that cases turn heavily on the facts
and that outcomes have limited precedential value with each
case tried anew on its unique facts.
The fact-intensive nature of civil rights claims and the
multiple procedural hurdles confronting plaintiffs permit judges
to sit as though in equity, no matter the relief sought.448 Judges
are required to determine whether the plaintiff has stated
sufficient cause to proceed as soon as suits are filed.449 If an
officer is the defendant, the judge must reexamine the facts to
determine whether a reasonable officer would know a clearly
established right might have been violated under the specific
“severe threat to public safety” in supporting qualified immunity for the
officer: “It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a
suspect in order to end a serious threat to public safety, the officer need not
stop shooting until the threat has ended.” Id. at 777. The Court has taken a
similar approach in cases with much less evidence of exigency. See Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018). It is evident that the Court’s main
concern is to analyze the situation from the perspective of the officer claiming
immunity to determine whether the law was clear and the actions represent a
knowing violation of that law. The focus on the threat and the exigency both
justifying the behavior under the Fourth Amendment and supporting qualified
immunity in Plumhoff is made more significant by the Court’s consistent
emphasis that qualified immunity determinations be made early in the
proceedings and that discovery should usually not be allowed. See Sigert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991).
446. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 273, at 1402.
447. Despite the intent language, civil rights cases are made into a kind of
negligence with “fault” as the key focus. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The
Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999)
(“[C]urrent doctrine sharply curtails damages lability for constitutional
violations, chiefly by requiring proof of fault . . . by a government
officer . . . . [g]enerally . . . negligence . . . .”).
448. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights,
Social Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1994
(2006) (“Legal process legitimacy concerns, legal realist outcome-oriented
goals, and the peculiarities of the human mind are all, to varying degrees,
consistent with a preference for fact-base adjudication.”).
449. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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circumstances of the case.450 Thereafter, discovery might
proceed only for the judge to determine, on loosely defined
substantive grounds, whether the facts developed in discovery
might still support recovery.451 Having cleared these hurdles, a
plaintiff can present his case to the fact finder who is, like the
judge before, largely unbounded in their assessment of whether
a right was violated.452 That assessment is, ultimately, a search
for a justification for judicial intervention: is this a case of an
outrage committed by the defendant, whether private or
public?453 Vesting judges with this degree of authority is
arguably why employment discrimination litigants face steep
odds of prevailing.454
450. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
451. See id. at 817 (“Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore
may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons,
including an official’s professional colleagues.”).
452. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Gesell, J., concurring) (“It is not difficult for ingenious plaintiff’s counsel to
create a material issue of fact on some element of the immunity defense where
subtle questions of constitutional law and a decisionmaker’s mental processes
are involved.”).
453. The effect and operation of qualified immunity as a search of
outrageous behavior is underscored by a comparison of Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730 (2002), and Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 768 (2014). The two cases are
usually cited to note the Court’s requirement in Hope that a case on point is
not necessary to show clearly established law while Plumhoff finds qualified
immunity in part because there is no case on point. But the facts of the cases
highlight the consequences of looking at the case from the eyes of the officer
and, from that perspective, a generalized search for an outrage. Hope involved
officers supervising a prison work crew who implemented a practice of
chaining prisoners they thought malingering to a post in the hot sun. See 536
U.S. at 73335. Plumhoff involved a police chase that ended in a shooting. See
572 U.S. at 768. In Hope, the officers faced no exigency; instead, theirs was a
considered decision to enforce compliance with the work crew assignment. 536
U.S. at 73435. Looking through the officer’s eyes, the adoption of a
disciplinary policy by officers on the ground could nevertheless be considered
outrageous. The constitutional right could be determined to be clearly
established because the facts of the case were largely static and not subject to
much second-guessing. The event was largely binominal with the plaintiff
injured by the policy decision of the officers, and the Court’s role much like
that of an umpire. Deciding that the constitutional right was clearly
established removed the Court from the center of the dispute.
454. Summarizing a vast literature on this phenomenon, Margaret Lemos
notes:
Employment discrimination plaintiffs win about thirty percent of
the cases that go to trial, compared to a win rate between fifty to
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Fact intensiveness also means that where private law
governs the underlying dispute, the presence of a superior
federal right is no guarantee of plaintiff success. As Robert
Glennon said of the Burger Court in 1978, “Evidence is
mounting that the most important theme . . . is the protection of
state interests and deference to state courts.”455 The unbounded
nature of the inquiry, combined with courts’ emphasis on
causation and on the plaintiff’s burden of proof, means that
plaintiffs must exclude all alternative explanations of the harm
in question. If private law supports the outcome, the plaintiff is
hard pressed to show that the rights violation asserted is the
cause of the harm.456 Similarly, a de facto deservedness analysis
underlies civil rights suits where jurisprudence has been
dominated by questions about how much weight to give to
plaintiff’s deservedness (e.g., the weight given an officer’s
perception of threatening or criminal behavior in excessive force
cases).457
Civil rights jurisprudence has become equity of a sort. It is
rooted in exceptional circumstances that triggered the crafting

sixty percent for plaintiffs in tort and contract cases. They tend to
do even worse in cases that are decided prior to trial on a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, winning less than ten percent of
those cases, while tort and contract plaintiffs win slightly more
than thirty percent. Employment discrimination plaintiffs also fare
terribly on appeal—a phenomenon that scholars have attributed to
an erroneous belief among appellate judges that trial judges are too
plaintiff friendly. Moreover, while litigation rates shot up after
Congress made noneconomic and punitive damages available to
Title VII plaintiffs in 1991, the plaintiff win rate went down.
Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L REV. 782, 831 (2011)
(footnotes omitted). While Lemos notes that settlement of Title VII cases went
up after 1991, she argues that was not necessarily a sign of improvement. Id.
at 831–32; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1982 (2017) [hereinafter Johnson, Equality Law
Pluralism] (“Yet there is also evidence of a countertrend in that the volume of
cases does not necessarily lead to better implementation of the statutory
goals.”).
455. Robert Jerome Glennon, Constitutional Liberty & Property: Federal
Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 355, 355 (1978).
456. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 1962 (“Facts alone do not supply the
judgment necessary to decide whether a legal burden on a social group is
reasonable. As David Hume famously put the point, an ‘ought’ cannot be
derived from an ‘is.’”).
457. See id. at 1973.
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of exceptional remedies drawn from equity; circumscribed by
application of traditional equity doctrine to restrict courts’
power as the focus of such suits shifted from eradicating Jim
Crow to addressing individual discrimination claims; and
transferred to damages actions by drawing on popular notions
of equity. It has come to reflect presumptions of equity as a
definition of the proper role of courts in society.
B.

Is There Anything Wrong with Civil Rights Equity?

Civil rights equity is offered as a description of the state of
civil rights jurisprudence, but it is not clear that that state
would be different if subject to significant reform.458 After all,
Douglas Laycock has argued that the merger of law and equity
has so integrated the systems that it is distracting to speak of
them separately; thus civil rights equity might be little more
than a demonstration of the combined system produced by the
merger as it operates in civil rights jurisprudence.459 Still, civil
rights equity at least suggests that “rights” are less valuable
than we think, operating as they do without the character Chief
Justice Marshall ascribed to them in analogy to private
rights.460
Nor might civil rights equity be necessarily problematic in
its operation, as it produces a civil rights jurisprudence that is
sensitive to community-held notions of justice.461 It is true that
the “community” vison of justice is largely articulated by district
court judges who may represent only a tiny sliver of the
community and who have, for years, been hostile to civil rights
claims and, it seems, claimants.462 Further, the fact-intensive

458. This is a point made by Jeffries and Rutherglen concerning the results
of limitations on damages actions. Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 273, at
1405.
459. See Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, supra note 429, at 82 (“Except
where references to equity have been codified, as in the constitutional
arguments about jury trial, law-equity arguments are always exclusively a
misleading distraction.”).
460. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
461. See Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696,
702 (1913) (“But justice according to magisterial good sense, unhampered by
rule, is more apt to accord with the moral sense of the community, when
administered by a strong man, than justice according to technical rule.”).
462. See Lemos, supra note 454, at 823–40.
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nature of civil rights claims so structured gives lay juries the
ability to project their biases and prejudices onto civil rights
claims.463 But such a structure gives considerable legitimacy to
civil rights, even if, given the low success rate of such cases, the
public maintains a distorted view of the frequency of civil rights
violations.464
However commonplace or community-rooted, it must be
said that what civil rights equity does is sap civil rights law of
its social change capacity. Rights claims that are
multidimensional cease to be the basis for changing behavior of
powerful actors and institutions.465 Nor does civil rights equity
offer succor to plaintiffs in cases that run against broadly held
For
victims
of
widespread
but
expectations.466
underacknowledged discrimination, police abuse, or sexual
violence, civil rights litigation so framed is not built to help. And
this suppression of civil rights law’s social change capacity
might override the benefit of restrictions on damages
liability— facilitating constitutional innovation467—by focusing
courts not on fault as such, but on outrageousness of
governmental conduct. Constitutional or statutory civil rights
can still be utilized to get courts to recognize groups or claims
heretofore unrecognized.468 In any case, civil rights actions
463. Or just their reluctance to explain outcomes as discriminatory. See
Eyer, supra note 302, at 1291.
464. See Lemos, supra note 454, at 789 (“Although American society
frequently is denounced as excessively litigious, the reality is that only a tiny
fraction of those who encounter potential justiciable problems consult a
lawyer, much less sue.”).
465. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 2010 (“Because the current
fact-based model enables courts to sidestep stare decisis constraints, the case
law regarding a given social group often appears to have a random quality,
with no overarching theory to explain why burdens are sustained in some
areas but not in others.”).
466. See id. at 1974 (explaining that only when new perceptions of group
members reveal and reject normal expectations are courts likely to experience
pressure to incorporate those changed views).
467. See Jeffries, supra note 447, at 90–91 (arguing that a de facto fault
requirement in constitutional rights cases facilities constitutional innovation).
468. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General:
Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1350 (2012)
[hereinafter Johnson, Equality Directives in American Law] (“In considering
legislation to overturn Twombly and Iqbal, many members of Congress
explicitly invoked private enforcement as a key to vindicating statutory and
constitutional goals of equality.”).
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remain effective to combat gross abuses of government authority
through policy or aimed at an individual, either because the
interests in the litigation are narrow or because such an abuse
is outrageousthat is, either because it is not treated as civil
rights equity or because it satisfies the requirements of civil
rights equity.469
This view of civil rights litigation may disappoint, but it is
not worthless, especially because it permits recognition of
identities and rights. The public learns what it should and
shouldn’t do from both the recognition and enforcement of rights
by courts. A decision that a government or private defendant has
violated a right helps demarcate the defining values of the
American political and legal landscape.470 Judicial decisions
make a unique and powerful contribution to the edifying
process, transforming some kinds of behavior from boorish to
“illegal” or from acceptable to discriminatory. This aspect of
rights is particularly prominent in the recognition of protected
identities471 and rights, but civil rights equity corrupts this
useful aspect of rights litigation by suppressing decisions
applying rights except where notions of outrage give emerging
or deep-seeded views of appropriate behavior great
significance.472 Courts cede their role in developing civic norms,
as perhaps they intend to do, but their role recognizing
identities and rights is not unimportant.

469. See id. at 1363 (“Under these statutes, a set of regulatory
requirements has emerged that places proactive and affirmative duties on
federally funded actors.”).
470. See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS,
AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALIST STATE 22 (2010) (stating that “legalized
accountability” might also change behavior).
471. Though a LGBTQ person might be able to assert a claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex, for example, that claim is beside the point
if the discrimination is based on the person’s LGBTQ identity. Recognition of
that identity both educates the public and operates in a law-like way,
establishing rights that have real value in courts and in the world. But that
value comes from the recognition itself. This is why decisions like Obergefell
are important and ought not be underestimated.
472. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 1957 (“But where longstanding
judgments regarding a group have become destabilized and new norms have
yet to be settled, courts’ involvement in selecting between ‘old’ and ‘new’ norms
produces anxieties regarding the judicial role in responding to societal
change.”).
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This theory of civil rights litigation is almost surely
different, however, from what most have come to expect civil
rights to be. Indeed, civil rights equity mutes much of the
promise of rights by making rights enforcement contingent and
variable.473 It circumscribes the “social change” potential of
rights, buttressing rather than challenging the status quo ante.
Civil rights equity is a vehicle for normalizing civil rights, doing
so by draining them of their revolutionary implications.
C.

Caveats

A few caveats are in order. First, this Article does not cover
the extent of the influence of civil rights. Civil rights equity is a
theory of the treatment of civil rights in civil litigation. Civil
rights have been nurtured and have taken on much of their form
from administrative guidance.474 Similarly, what rights exist,
their form, and their function is largely a product of the polity’s,
rather than courts’, view of what is “right.”475 Second, as an
introduction, this Article does not detail the operation of the
many areas that constitute civil rights law.
Third, civil rights equity is not offered as an exclusive
theory of courts’ behavior. Civil rights equity neither requires
nor discounts, for instance, theories that judges are biased or
hostile to civil rights litigants or civil rights claims. Nor is civil
rights equity a detailed critique of procedural law, constitutional
law, or remedies jurisprudence. Instead, civil rights equity
maintains that the jurisprudential style that informs judges’
view of how civil rights cases ought to be handled is one rooted
in equity, is informed by equity constraints, and substantively
envisages a role for civil rights that resembles popular notions
of the role of traditional equity. This style is partly imposed by
473. See Johnson, Equality Directives in American Law, supra note 468, at
1354 (describing the success of civil rights enforcement as heavily dependent
on the judicial embrace of rules governing pleading, summary judgment,
standing, and fee recovery).
474. See id. at 1362–70 (describing a model for American equality
directives); Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, supra note 454, at 193
(explaining regulatory tools that promote inclusion).
475. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 1988 (stating that where legislative
and public policy shifts have eliminated legal burdens on certain groups,
courts that affirm the traditional negative norm disrespect and disrupt the
democratic process).
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precedent and partly by judicial attitude.476 Civil rights, it
seems, is assumed to be supplemental, subordinate, and for
deserving plaintiffs in unusual circumstances.
V.

THE ALLURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS EQUITY

Civil rights equity has a number of significant effects. By
softening the operation of civil rights, civil rights equity
dampens the revolutionary legacy of the Civil Rights Movement
and moderates its larger impact on government, society, and the
economy. It is the operative basis for a conservative rights
regime that can aggressively respond to government abuse but
without opening the courts to everyday rights litigation.
Structurally, civil rights equity: preserves the primacy of
private law over civil rights; does the heavy lifting in keeping
courts out of complex political disputes as anticipated by
Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority;477 and permits a judicial restraint that
nonetheless keeps the judiciary central to rights enforcement.478
The power of civil rights equity as a theory might most strongly
derive from its resolution of a number of paradoxes about civil
rights that bedevil popular discussion of rights.
A.

Dampening the Revolutionary Implications of Civil Rights

Civil rights equity responds to three different revolutionary
implications of civil rights by importing a flexibility that
significantly reduces the disruptive effect of rights on the
constitutional system. Rights-based legalism threatened to
make public rights dominant over private rights, perhaps
making anti-discrimination and due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment the principle legal doctrines in American law.
Similarly, the twentieth-century rights revolution promised to
realize the structural implications of the Fourteenth
Amendment, subordinating state law to a supreme rights
regime at the federal level. Last, such a regime would involve
476. See id. at 1964 (discussing the pervasive practice of fact-based
adjudication).
477. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
478. This is the second, structural function of constitutional remedies
described by Fallon and Meltzer. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 73, at 1787–91.
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federal courts in everyday legal disputes: retail cases, if you will.
Civil rights equity dampens these revolutionary implications,
perhaps achieving the balance that legal process scholars
sought.479
B.

Structuring a Conservative Rights Regime

Civil rights equity provides a basis for a conservative rights
regime, clawing back the social change focus of rights in the
Civil Rights Era while preserving rights as a means to combat
government abuse. The contemporary conservative movement’s
focus on limited government and the increasingly libertarian
tenets of that conservatism have always been of two minds
about rights. Understanding that government abuse could be
corralled by rights, the broad conservative call to go back to a
pre-Brown world made sense only because Brown was cast as
improper. For such critics, Brown was not about rights but about
something elsesociology, psychology, social engineering,
defiling of the constitutional order. The substance of the civil
rights period aside, rights-based legalism was always a
potentially conservative approach to constitutionalism,
depending on how rights were constructed.
By structuring rights cases and treating the most
complicated as something akin to equity, civil rights equity
empowers courts to operate as a bulwark against government
abuse in civil liberties cases while limiting the role of courts in
more complicated disputes.480 In those complicated disputes,
civil rights equity permits courts to express what judges insist
are broad sentiments of the general public.481 With successful
civil rights cases turning on outrages, the community’s vision of
injustice is defended and courts remain generally respectful of

479. See Bickel, supra note 111, at 65.
480. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 1999–2000 (“Because fact-based
reasoning places an extra barrier that must be overcome before a would-be
detractor can criticize a court’s legitimacy and capacity, courts are less
vulnerable to criticism of overstepping by hinging decisions on relatively
uncontested facts and avoiding overt selection among competing norms.”)
481. See Vilhelm Lundstedt, Relation Between Law and Equity, 25 TUL. L.
REV. 59, 61 (1950) (“They are only nominal judgments depending on the
valuing feeling or sentiment of the person who makes them.”).
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separation of powers and federalism,482 while ensuring that
everyday disputes can be dismissed.
C.

Preserving Pre-Rights Era Understandings of the Legal
System

Civil rights equity has operated to buttress pre-civil rights
era understandings of the legal system. Civil rights equity
operates to prioritize private law over ostensibly supreme public
rights. It is a mechanism for achieving the restraint goals of
Ashwander, providing a rationale for such restraint as it does
so. More generally, it fulfills the post-civil rights period’s
aspiration of judicial restraint while cementing the federal
judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional and statutory
rights.483
1.

Prioritizing Private Rights over Civil Rights

As rights identified in the Constitution or created by federal
statute, civil rights trump state law by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause.484 In doing so, civil rights threaten to supplant private
law. This threat was somewhat mitigated by the state action
requirement that several civil rights statutes abandoned.485
And, in a pre-Erie world, one could imagine the private law
insulated from civil rights because federal courts could actively
manage the line between federal rights and the common law.486
After Erie, private law is understood to be state law and federal

482. Of course, such an alignment of civil rights with community
impressions can make rights illiberal if the community is so. See Robert C.
Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, 7 CONST. COMMENT 227, 234 (1990)
(“Hence the only purpose which Brennan could perceive in American
federalism was the creation of a ‘federal structure’ conducive to ‘securing
individual liberty.’”).
483. See Goldberg, supra note 448, at 2003 (discussing how equity can
curtail the reach of stare decisis considerations).
484. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
485. See Isaac Saidel-Goley, Things Invisible to See: State Action & Private
Property, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 439, 445–47 (2018).
486. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 924 (2013) (describing the relationship between
state and federal courts before Erie).
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civil rights claims, when they come into conflict with private
rights claims, supersede them.487
In cases involving equitable relief judges could manage
conflicts between federal rights and the common law,
particularly because traditional equity prioritized the common
law (private law) over equitable intervention, supplying a ready
hierarchy of rights. Civil rights equitable remedies inherited
this tradition, which was readily deployed as the Court shifted
its focus from Jim Crow to individual civil rights. But as
damages suits became more prominent in civil rights litigation,
the conflicts with state law were magnified, and magnified
further in suits against private parties. Paul v. Davis
underscores the frustration—there, Justice Rehnquist
complained that Section 1983 is not a font of common law.488 By
treating civil rights law like equity, courts diminish the
circumstances for applying civil rights law, the scope of its
impact, and the development of precedent. The effect is the
preservation of the primacy of private law governing social
relations489 by limiting the scope of civil rights to extraordinary
cases, defined to a great degree as those not governed by the
common law.
2.

Working as a Mechanism of Ashwander Restraint

Civil rights equity also provides a means of operationalizing
Ashwander restraint. In Justice Brandeis’s Ashwander
concurrence, the Justice articulated canons of judicial
self-restraint that would operate to keep the court from
exceeding its political authority when jurisdiction and the
existence of recognized rights otherwise counseled for judicial

487. See id. at 950–973 (discussing the impact and significance of the Erie
decision).
488. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
489.
“As a matter of substantive constitutional doctrine, the Court has
drawn distinct lines between what it considers state law wrongs and
constitutional torts, and has relegated the former to the arena of state tort
remedies.” David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 23, 25 (1989) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31
(1986); Whitley v. Abers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144–46 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)).
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intervention.490 These principles of judicial self-restraint would
inform Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch and
become known as doctrines of justiciabilitystanding,
mootness, ripeness, and political question—which courts have
increasingly used to stymie broad civil rights attacks on
persistent social problems.491 More broadly, the cry of judicial
activism has reigned as the seminal attack on civil rights
jurisprudence, particularly where it effects social change.492
Though the growth of justiciability doctrines has created a basis
for judicial self-restraint, the doctrines still amount to the
Court’s assessment of whether there is a case or controversy for
it to decide.493 Judicial self-restraint presumably also
encourages courts to decline to act even where there is a case or
controversy, particularly if a basis for not acting is the risk to
the court’s legitimacy rather than the extent of its
jurisdiction.494
Civil rights equity provides a basis for operationalizing
Ashwander in two complementary ways. First, it defines the
kinds of cases where courts should exercise caution: those where
the question goes beyond recognition (of identities or rights)
under the Constitution or statutes, especially those implicating
complex, multidimensional disputes. This basis for
self-restraint is malleable to be sure, but it is principled and
reflects the very concern that seemed to underlie Ashwander.495
That is, civil rights equity becomes operative where the court is
490. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (recounting cases that the Court has dismissed that
have challenged the constitutionality of acts of Congress).
491. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984).
492. See Rudovsky, supra note 180, at 24–25 (discussing how 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 has become “the statute of choice for the litigation of constitutional tort
actions” and how the “reorientation of civil rights jurisprudence has blunted
the impact of § 1983”).
493. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).
494. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 356
In proceedings for a mandamus, where, also, the remedy is granted
not as a matter of right but in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion, courts decline to enter upon the enquiry when there is a
serious doubt as to the existence of the right or duty sought to be
enforced. (citation omitted)
495. See id. at 318–22 (finding that, because the Court had previously
decided cases where shareholders challenged corporate acts on constitutional
grounds, standing should be found here).
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at risk of being pulled into a complex, politically charged dispute
in which the Court’s role as a neutral umpire is undermined and
it is least likely to be able to provide simple orders.496 Cases
implicating social change especially reflect these characteristics
and trigger equity-like limitations that insulate courts from
such controversies.497 Second, civil rights equity provides a
means of processing cases of this complex nature that avoids
casting the Court as just walking away.498 The result might be
the same but civil rights equity provides courts a range of tools
to actually “decide” such cases according to what appears to be
traditional judicial doctrines.
3.

Permitting Judicial Restraint in a Supreme Judiciary

Most broadly, civil rights equity implements the Court’s
post-Civil Rights Movement aspirations for judicial restraint
while keeping the judiciary central to calibrating the rights
regime.499 This balance is delicate and the work that civil rights
equity does is central to it. The equity-infused approach allows
courts to reject most rights cases that run against prevailing
social expectations.500 Thus, the social change capacity of civil
rights is throttled. Simultaneously, civil rights equity permits
courts to intervene where they believe an injustice or outrage
exists.501
496. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 936 (discussing how in the issue of
qualified immunity, for example, legal remedies are often barred but equitable
remedies will be made available).
497. See id. at 943 (arguing that the justiciability requirement standards
make it difficult to prove standing in civil rights cases and create a barrier to
injunctive relief).
498. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 321 (stating that “the opportunity to
resort to equity, in the absence of an adequate legal remedy . . . should not be
curtailed because of reluctance to decide constitutional questions”).
499. Alex Reinert argues that though the Court placed procedural
limitations on damages actions “the Court is consolidating its power. And
moving civil rights litigation into the equitable camp is one way of doing so,
because equity is controlled by judges.” See Reinert, supra note 39, at 946.
Framing damages actions to mimic equity does so more broadly.
500. See id. at 931 (stating that “[c]ommentators for good reason often
speak of the Court’s general hostility to civil rights litigation as a thumb on
the scale in the most contested cases”).
501. See id. (stating that, contrarily, there has been a line of cases that
“suggests an openness to enforcing traditional civil rights values of due process
and rule of law”).
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Though central under civil rights equity, the judiciary is not
wholly independent. First, judges are loosely constrained by
public opinion defining (however imperfectly) social outrage.502
Second, the fact-intensive nature of most civil rights cases
means that even a judge with a strong opinion about an
“injustice” will often still need to submit that case to the jury to
identify its view of a remediable outrage. Third, judges are
subject to an appeals process that subjects their view of an
outrage to judgment by appellate peers. The ongoing contest for
control of the judiciary through the appointments process, while
a manifestation of the divisive nature of political discourse
today, is made more relevant by the extreme power that the civil
rights equity approach preserves in courts.503 Courts can defy
public opinion or even the sentiments of the elected branches by
constructing disputes as outrages that need to be addressed if
their views are broadly shared within the judiciary.504
The flexible approach to civil rights cases that civil rights
equity establishes permits the federal judiciary to preserve its
supremacy in constitutional interpretation while cabining the
disruptive effect of civil rights from overwhelming the courts’
constitutional jurisprudence. One version is the aforementioned
extension of Ashwander. But the other, broader effect of civil
rights equity is that it distinguishes “civil rights” from
constitutionalism and ensures that the former is a lesser,
included part of the latter. The Civil Rights Movement and the
rapid expansion of rights-based constitutionalism implied that
the Constitution was fundamentally substantive (at least after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) and that structural
aspects of the Constitution were secondary to this substantive

502. See Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the
U.S. Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 76 (2010) (arguing that “justices
have an institutional incentive to think about the context in which they make
decisions, and this context includes public opinion”).
503. See Reinert, supra note 39, at 946 (positing that the Court’s
preference for injunctions in civil rights cases comes from the Court
consolidating power to and within the judiciary).
504. See Rachlinski, supra note 334, at 1252–54 (discussing the new
heightened pleading standard under Iqbal and the “reluctance to allow
individuals to use access to the courts (and discovery) as a means of
scrutinizing institutional actors” perhaps stemming from the increased
number of federal judges who previously worked for these institutional actors).
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regime.505 Civil rights equity reverses this by making rights
claims exceptional and contingent on broad notions of outrage
and injustice.506 Routine disputes are no longer the stuff of civil
rights cases, even as the Court’s rejection of structural reform
made broad institutional challenges a dead letter. Thus, in civil
rights jurisprudence, the role of the judiciary is defined as
intervening to address governmental incursions of individual
liberty (civil liberties cases) or, in more complex cases (civil
liberties cases implicating multidimensional disputes between
multiple individuals or groups, or civil rights cases, which
always implicate multidimensional disputes), intervening to
address abuse of rights (outrages, miscarriages of justice).
D.

Resolving Civil Rights Paradoxes

Civil rights equity is also helpful to explain widely held
notions about civil rights that seem contradictory. First, many
see the broad civil rights jurisprudence as ever-present and
robust, some would say oppressive, even as claimants in civil
rights cases have extremely low success rates.507 Generally, the
explanation of this contradiction is that civil rights cases are
sufficiently embarrassing that individuals tread lightly.508 Civil
rights equity offers another explanation: successful cases,
however rare, constitute broad indictments of the institution
and its leaders precisely because it will rightly be understood
that the underlying behavior was sufficiently outrageous to
justify extraordinary judicial intervention.509 So civil rights
litigation comes to be understood as a contest to appeal beyond

505. See Glennon, supra note 208, at 358 (“The fourteenth amendment and
its substantive cause of action, section 1983, created federal rights and
provided a federal forum for their vindication.”).
506. See BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, supra note 101, at 162–64 (discussing
how pecuniary damages have limitations as a solution to controversy, while
courts in equity can impose direct ordersthough not without their own
limitations).
507. See BERREY ET AL., supra note 431, at 293 (showing the percentage of
plaintiff trial wins for employment discrimination cases is 2.14 percent).
508. See EPP, supra note 470, at 22 (observing the fear of liability for the
public embarrassment and reputational damages that goes along with it).
509. See Chayes, supra note 182, at 1302 (concluding that “[t]he subject
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about
private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public policy”).
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the courts, to establish that a deep miscarriage of justice has
occurred. In this view, it is not just that defendants resist
settlement because they are likely to win, but also that
settlement implies acknowledgement of more than the routine
right or wrong of a car accident or breach of contract; it suggests
a moral and institutional failing.
Second, it is widely assumed that civil rights robustly
protect minorities, despite the failure of civil rights law to
produce substantial benefits linked to particular areas of civil
rights law for minority communities.510 In the case of Black
Americans, for example, employment discrimination protections
have not wiped away disproportionate unemployment, wage
inequalities, and broad disparaging assumptions about Black
Americans’ fitness for attractive employment.511 Much has been
written in an effort to explain this contradiction, but the notion
that civil rights protections are available only for extreme cases
of discrimination as opposed to the routine prejudice that infects
employment decisions is a strong explanation of this paradox.512
Civil rights litigation focused on outrages is not amenable to
addressing problems like embedded, routine prejudice, much
less implicit bias.
An additional, related paradox that this view of civil rights
explains is how civil rights protections can expand continuously
and remain unsatisfactory to those they are supposed to
protect.513 Though more rights have been recognized and more
groups covered by civil rights, that expanded coverage does not
seem closely correlated with social change.514 Arguably, the lack

510. See id. at 1310 (discussing the issues surrounding the widespread
impact of public law litigation and lack of adequate representation for those
affected).
511. See Economic New Release: Table A-2. Employment Status of the
Civilian Population by Race, Sex, and Age, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Sept. 3,
2021), https://perma.cc/C4TN-XYU7 (showing the unemployment rate for the
black civilian noninstitutional population being 9.1 percent in August of 2021
compared to the white civilian noninstitutional population being 4.6 percent).
512. See Eyer, supra note 302, at 1276 (noting that “less than 5% of all
discrimination plaintiffs will ever achieve any form of litigated relief”).
513. See id. at 1279–80 (suggesting that expansion of recognition might be
related to lower success rates).
514. See id. at 1280 (positing that in order to effectuate improved outcomes
for victims of discrimination, alternative methods for reform may need to be
employed).
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of recognition is tantamount to a kind of non-existence in a
shrinking, pop-culture infused world. Yet rights for the
recognized group seem ancillary to social change, except in
initiating a conversation about status. Thus, many arguments
about the limits of law have emerged, suggesting that law is an
inappropriate, clumsy, or broken tool for change that should be
relegated to a secondary role to organizing, protesting, or
voting.515 Surely law’s role is not superior to these important
political tools but neither should it be regarded as subordinate
to them. In any case, the promise of “rights” implies a powerful
if not superior role for law that is not supported by how civil
rights have worked in the United States. Law’s importance in
ensuring “justice” where there is none underscores the value of
recognition, while its operation as a supplement to “normal law,”
tailored for use in cases of outrages, explains the limitations of
and disappointments with civil rights law in producing social
justice.
Ultimately, the civil rights equity view of civil rights law
explains an uncomfortable adage. It is commonplace for people
to say, “but if it were a black person, you wouldn’t . . . ,” implying
that, in whosever’s interest the speaker is speaking, they should
get the same rights that Black people do. Unfortunately, in most
of these cases it isn’t clear that a Black person would enjoy
protection from civil rights. This use of a notion of the Black
person as the special ward of the state through civil rights is an
assumption that has undercut the legitimacy of civil rights516 by
positing it as biased, but it also glosses over the significant
hurdles to recovery in civil rights cases.517 Thus, the adage
extends the benefits of civil rights law on whosever’s behalf it is
invoked, while the Black citizens to which the adage referred
may never have enjoyed those benefits. Because civil rights

515. See, e.g., Johnson, Equality Directives in American Law, supra note
468, at 1342–43 (arguing to place “positive duties on state actors to promote
equality and inclusion” rather than relying on a fragmented enforcement
system via the courts).
516. This dates to at least Justice Bradley’s opinion in The Civil Rights
Cases. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
517. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedure Hurdles in the
Quest for Justice, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 621 (2011) (suggesting that
pleading standards, class action requirements, and forced arbitration are
creating substantial procedural hurdles in bringing civil rights cases).
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equity permits widely held presumptions to guide legal
outcomes, the contradiction described here falls away.
The public believes civil rights law is robust and seeks to
extend its benefits horizontally to all those meeting the
presumption of their beliefs. Consequently, civil rights law has
been disseminated broadly even if its depth of coverage leaves
much to be desired. And since civil rights equity presumes civil
rights are available only in extreme cases measured against
popular presumptions, civil rights protections extend vertically
only to those cases jurists believe represent injustice. The
imagined recoverable violation against the Black litigant
operates comfortably as the standard for protecting others.
CONCLUSION
Because of equity’s focus on substantive justice, popular
notions of equity cast it as liberating: equity comes to the rescue
where the law fails. But as a system that is supplemental, equity
is also limiting. Equity as a model for law diminishes it,
preventing it from doing justice. Similarly, flexibility in legal
regimes—standards over rules—is seen as liberating, giving
judges the means to do justice. But that very flexibility can work
against achieving justice. In a flexible regime, justice becomes
optional. And where the tools created to reconcile a flexible
system of equity with law’s important values of consistency and
predictability are deployed to avoid consistency and
predictability, flexibility becomes a ready means of limiting the
occasions for justice. The pursuit of justice is reserved for some
cases, some of the time. This is civil rights equity: a special use
of equity ideals to make civil rights more flexible, less certain,
and less consistent—less law.

